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Abstrac t

The security threat from malicious insiders affects all organizations. Mitigating
this problem is quite difficult due to the fact that (1) there is no definitive profile for
malicious insiders, (2) or ganizations have placed trust in these individuals, and (3)
ins ide rs have a vast knowledge of their organization’s personnel, security policies, and
information systems.
The purpose of this research is to analyze to what extent the United States Air
Force (USAF) security policies address the insider threat problem. The policies are
reviewed in terms of how well they align with best practices published by the Carnegie
Mellon University Computer Emergency Readiness Team and additional factors this
research deems important, including motivations, organizational priorities, and social
networks.
Based on the findings of the policy review, this research offers actionable
recommendations that the USAF could implement in order to better prevent, detect, and
respond to malicious insider attacks. The most important course of action is to better
utilize its workforce. All personnel should be trained on observable behaviors that can be
precursors to malicious activity. Additionally, supervisors need to be empowered as the
first line of defense, monitoring for stress, unmet expectations, and disgruntlement. In
addition, this research proposes three new best practices regarding (1) screening for prior
concerning behaviors, predispositions, and technical incidents, (2) issuing sanctions for
inappropriate technical acts, and (3) requiring supervisors to take a proactive role.
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MITIGATING INSIDER SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE:
A REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE’S CURRENT POSTURE

I. Introduction

1.1 Overview
The security threat from malicious insiders is a substantial problem in all
organizations today. In this research an insider is defined as someone who is or has been
with the or ga nization and can be from any of the following categories: employees,
service providers, consultants, and contractors (CSO, 2007). Activities and methods used
by insiders can vary from espiona ge to sabotaging an organization’s network. According
to CSO magazine’s “2007 E-Crime Watch Survey,” 26% of the security events occurring
in that year were known or believed to be caused by insiders, compared with 58% being
attributed to outsiders. Of the 671 security executives and law enforcement officials
surveyed, 29% of them felt the greatest threat to cyber security came from insiders,
compared to 41% who believed outsiders presented the greater risk (CSO, 2007). When
comparing the cost of attacks, 34% of the respondents cited insider attacks as being the
most damaging, compared to 37% choosing attacks from outsiders (CSO, 2007).
One of the reasons why the insider threat problem is so difficult to combat, as
well as why these attacks can be so damaging, is because insiders are trusted by and have
knowledge of the or ganization. Insiders have a huge advantage compared to outsiders by
already knowing the organization’s personnel, security policies, and information systems

(Mills et al., 2009). In addition, the or ganization has consciously decided to put trust in
its employees and may even ha ve subjected them to background checks and interviews.
In the case of former insiders, the trust may have been rescinded but these
individuals retain their knowledge of the organization’s functions, people, and processes.
Non-disclosure agreements are often used to de ter individuals from using that knowledge,
but the risk exists nonetheless.
The vast majority of the respondents of the “2007 E-Crime Watch Survey” were
more concerned about attacks tha n they were the previous year, and only 11% saw a
decrease in the number of and financial loss from targeted attacks. Given these figures it
is surprising that the results showed that the average spe nding o n information technology
and corporate security has decreased (CSO, 2007).

Additionally, implementing

appropriate security measures to prevent insider attacks does not appear to be a priority.
The creation and use of background checks, account and password management policies,
monitoring and auditing tools, and training and awareness programs all fell significantly
in 2007 (CSO, 2007).

Less than half of the respondents claimed to use the following

essential security measures: security and account audits, employee monitoring, training
and awareness programs, periodic risk assessments, reporting of misuse, and technically
enforced separation of duty policies (CSO, 2007).

In contrast, measures to prevent

outside attacks, such as the use of firewalls, SPAM filtering, and anti- virus tools, were
almost universally used (CSO, 2007).
It is important to note that even if an organization is not detecting malicious
activity, it may still be occurring. This organization may not have sufficient controls in
place as a result of the or ganization not having experienced an attack.
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Some

organizations fall into a “trust trap” in which they cut back on security measures since
they are not detecting any malicious activity and feel they can trust their employees
(Moore et al., 2008). However, an attack can come at any time, with the attackers and
methods of attack changing constantly. It can be difficult to know what mechanisms are
successfully preventing insider attacks, but companies may find out the hard way if they
cut back on security controls. With organizations primarily focusing their attention on
attacks coming from the outside, the current security environment is very attractive to
those insiders wishing to do harm.

1.2 Research Objectives
The purpose of this research is to analyze to what extent the United States Air
Force (USAF) security policies address the insider threat problem. The policies are first
examined using a set of best practices published by the Carnegie Mellon University
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CMU CERT) technical staff (Cappelli et al.,
2006; Band et al., 2006). Specifically, the research analyzes if and how well the USAF
security policies, as well as a few of the cornerstone Department of Defense (DoD)
policies, implement these best practices.
Furthermore the policies are reviewed in terms of how well they addressed the
variables in this research’s “Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.” This
mod el is based on the “Abstracted Common Model” developed by the CMU CERT
technical staff and additionally included the factors of social networks, insider
motivations, and organizational priorities. The Abstracted Common Model was selected
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as it was deemed most relevant and unde rstandable for the audience of USAF leade rs and
supervisors.
Based on the findings of the policy review, this research offers actionable
recommendations that the USAF could implement in order to better prevent, detect, and
respond to malicious insider attacks. In addition, this research proposes three new best
practices that can be used by any organization to mitigate this threat to security.

1.3 Scope
In the article “Analysis of End User Security Behavior s,” Stanton et al. (2005)
describe security incidents in terms of the intention (malicious, neutral, or beneficial) and
expertise (high o r low). While incidents of a neutral or beneficial nature may actually do
harm to an organization, such as “dangerous tinkering” and “naïve mistakes” (Stanton et
al., 2005), this research foc uses on incide nts of a malicious nature. Though malicious
acts requiring high expertise, termed “intentional destruction,” are often the most
dangerous, those requiring low expertise (“detrimental misuse”) are included as well
(Stanton et al., 2005). These acts of detrimental misuse may be precursory actions and
should not be ignored.
In risk assessment, a threat-source is an entity that exploits a vulnerability (Elky,
2006). While threats can come from many different sources, to include weather or an
electrical disruption, this research is only concerned with situations where malicious
insiders (i.e., people) are the threat-sources.
This research focuses on two categories of insider threat, sabotage and espionage,
which are deemed most relevant to the USAF. Sabotage is the destruction of company
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resources, such as deploying a logic bomb, while espionage entails the stealing and
selling of company information.
The intended audience of this research includes USAF leaders, supervisors, and
network professionals, especially those with the authority to affect and implement
organizational policies, controls, and climate. The research is purposefully written to
make the subject matter understandable to those without a technical background in
information technology or any of the modeling types. The problem of insider threat is
one which is mitigated only through a group endeavor, from high- level organizational
leaders to the front- line supervisors; in fact, the immediate supervisor is perhaps the
strongest part of the overall defense against insider threats.

1.4 Thesis Organization
This chapter described the significant problem that malicious insider attacks pose
on today’s organizations and briefly explained the objectives of this research. Chapter II
presents the current information published on ins ider threat, to include the variables that
come into play and historical case studies. Existing insider threat models are discussed,
as well as background information regarding logical data and systems dynamics
modeling.

Chapter III explains this research’s process for modeling the problem,

including the initial development of a logical da ta mod el and a system dynamics model.
This chapter also discusses the selection of the Abstracted Common Mode l as the basis of
this research’s Insider Threat Mod el for Sabotage and Espionage, which is used in the
USAF policy review. An explanation is also given of the incorporation of motivations,
organizational priorities, and social networks into this research’s final model. Chapter IV
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explains the methodology for the review of the DoD and USAF policies in terms of
insider threat mitigation measures, to include the best practices published by the CMU
CERT technical staff.

The results of the policy review are presented, as well as

recommendations aimed to assist the USAF in battling the insider problem. In addition,
this research proposes three new best practices that can be implemented by any
organization.

Finally, Chapter V provides a summary of the research along with a

discussion of its conclusions and impact. Recommendations for future research are also
provided.
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II. Literature Review

2.1 Overview
There is no definitive profile for a malicious insider or for an organization that
will suffer an insider attack. From analyzing case studies of actual attacks, researchers
have found themes and commonalities. This chapter discusses the current information
published on insider threat, in particular the various factor s and their incor por ation into
existing models.

Two historical case studies are presented in detail to further

demonstrate how these factors come into play. This chapter also provides background
information on logical data modeling and system dynamics modeling as both are used in
the models developed in this research.

2.2 Factors in the Insider Threat Problem
In examining the insider threat problem, current research articles and models
focus on one or more of the following factors: insider precursors, expectations, and
motivations; organizational controls, priorities, and trust; social networks; and event
triggers. This next section defines and takes a closer look at each of these.
2.2.1 Precursors of the Malicious Party
From analyzing case studies of famous insider attacks, researchers have found
that the orchestrators shared psychological, professional, legal, and economic
characteristics and behaviors, as well as committed similar technical precursory incidents
leading up to the actual attacks.
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Historically, malicious insiders have been described as intelligent, dishonest,
egotistical, passionate, and instable (Tuglular, 2000).

In addition, malicious insiders

often lack strength of character and self- control and are prone to taking risks. They
frequently have poo r social skills (Tuglular, 2000) and are resistant to c hange (Cappelli et
al., 2007). Malicious insiders may also ha ve participated in unusual sexual be havior and
had addictions to alcohol, drugs, or gambling (Under Secretary for Management, 2006).
Before launching attacks, ins iders ha ve often exhibited certain behaviors, such as making
alarming s tatements and acting o ut of character (Puleo, 2006).
In terms of the malicious parties’ professional life, they often exhibited poor,
declining, or inconsistent job performance; examples include failing to meet deadlines,
inability to handle an appropriate workload, and absenteeism.

In add ition, they may

have been dissatisfied with the ir job and believed they had poor job security (Puleo,
2006). Although not all insider attacks require a lot of skill, the case studies show that
the malicious parties often pos sessed strong professional skills, such as those in the realm
of information technology. In add ition, they usua lly had acquired a substantial amount of
professional knowledge regarding their organization’s structure, information systems, and
security policies and controls (Tuglular, 2000).
A similar problem to trying to identify traits and be haviors of malicious insiders is
that of trying to decide who in an organization can be trusted with classified information.
Again, there is no exclus ive set of factor s, but the federal government has created the
“Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information” (Under Secretary for Management, 2006). One of the areas of foc us for
these guidelines is whether individuals have a criminal record. If they do, they may be
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predisposed to illegal or immoral activity.

Another area examines the individuals’

financial situation, to include economic stability and security, as well as the presence of
any unusual activity. If employees are having, or have had, legal or financial problems,
they may be susceptible to blackmail or solicitations to commit espionage (Under
Secretary for Management, 2006).
Technical precursors are common in insider threat cases. In terms of sabotage
attacks, insiders usually preferred to “test the waters” before launching the full-blown
attack. In add ition, certain activities may have needed to take place in order for the attack
to be successful and possibly even more devastating, such as the destruction of recovery
materials. In espionage attacks, insiders have often conducted unusual or unauthorized
behavior on the network in order to obtain the information they needed. Examples of
precursory incidents include the following: accessing unauthorized websites, installing
unauthorized software, cracking passwords, escalating one’s privileges, creating covert
channels, sending coded messages (Mills et al., 2009), social engineering, orchestrating a
denial of service attack, purposefully not completing their job-related duties,
masquerading, unauthorized reading or modifying of resources (Phyo and Furnell, 2004),
stealing or hiding data, spamming, downgrading classifications, modifying activity logs,
and r edirecting output (Brackney and Anderson, 2004).
Figure 1 shows a taxonomy of observable precursors that was developed at a
Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) workshop. This single figure
combines many of the factors discussed earlier, to include technical precursors, economic
situation, and addictions. This taxonomy reiterates the broad range of behaviors that can
possibly come into play in the complex insider threat problem.
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Figure 1. Cyber Event/Observable Taxo nomy (Mills et al., 2009)

2.2.2 Insider’s Expectations
The recognition, rewards, freedoms, and responsibilities that insiders expect from
the ir management can also play a role in whether they commit malicious acts. In all
manager-employee relationships, there are psychological contracts, or unwritten
agreements, between the two parties (Robbins and Judge, 2008). If managers do not
fulfill employees’ expectations, the employees may become disgruntled (Moore et al.,
2008). As mentioned earlier, a common trait of malicious insiders is egotism. Many feel
they deserve frequent recognition, in terms of raises, promotions, and additional authority
or responsibility. If they feel they are underappreciated, they may decide to commit
espionage to earn more money or to commit sabotage as retaliation against the company.
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2.2.3 Event Triggers
Certain events can be factors in the insider threat problem. Most commonly,
events can increase or decrease an insiders’ motivation to launch an attack. Negative
events may worsen the mental, economic, or professional state of insiders, and they may
become more enticed to seek retaliation or profit. O n the other hand, positive events may
lessen their motivation as they may not want to risk their improved status. An event may
be at the individual level, such as a marriage, divorce, birth of child, death in family, or
health issue (Puleo, 2006). A negative event (from the insider’s perspective), such as an
assignment to a more demanding supervisor, can lead to a decrease in expectation
fulfillment and in turn increased disgruntlement (Moore et al., 2008). Events may also be
at the organizational level, to include restructuring, mergers, personnel cuts, and
relocation.
Recent articles have shown that nationwide events, suc h as the current economic
situation, can also trigger malicious insider activity. In uncertain times employees can
become nervous abo ut layoffs or disgruntled over not receiving a bonus or promotion. In
2008 a disgruntled employee of the city of San Francisco intentionally altered
administrative passwords, locking out the rest of the company from critical network
resources for days (Vijayan, 2008). This year it was discovered that a for mer Fannie Mae
contractor had planted malicious software on the company’s network after being
terminated (McMillan, 2009).
2.2.4 Social Networks
The relationships that insiders have within an organization can play into the
insider threat problem in two different and opposing ways. Per the Social Bond Theory,
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insiders who have strong relationships with their managers or co-workers are less likely
to commit a malicious act. If insiders feel attached to their co-workers, they do not want
to lose these friends hips either by their co-workers’ disapproving of their actions or the
company firing them (Theoharido u et al., 2005).

In a study looking for possible

predictors of withdrawal behaviors, a strong negative correlation was found between coworker satisfaction and unexcused absenteeism. The author theorized that this was due to
the employees not wanting to risk the friendships they had made with co-workers by
exhibiting deviant behavior (Blau, 1985). Additionally, insiders may feel committed to
these co-workers and not want to bring harm to them professionally by executing an
attack on the organization’s assets (Theoharidou et al., 2005). Historical attacks have
resulted in loss of customers and contracts, destruction of an organization’s critical
information and assets, decrease in worker productivity, and damages equaling millions
of dollars (Melara et al., 2003).
Workplace relationships could also increase insiders’ motivation to commit a
malicious act. Per the Social Learning Theory (Theoharidou et al., 2005), employees
who assoc iate with co-workers who are breaking the security policies may be more
inclined to commit wrongful acts, whether it is in conjunction with these role models or
by themselves (Theoharidou et al., 2005). The insiders may rationalize that the deviant
behavior is acceptable, especially if the co-workers are receiving benefits from it or, at
the very least, not getting caught.
2.2.5 Insider Motivations
As mentioned in the first chapter this research focuses on those insiders with
malicious intentions. While many factors, such as psychological traits, relationships, and
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event triggers, can increase or decrease their motivation to attack, according to Casey
(2004) the source of the motivation is one or more of the following:
•

Power reassurance (compensatory): mildly aggressive acts committed to see if
the attacker has the ability to accomplish them, boosts self-confidence (Mills et
al., 2009)

•

Power assertive (entitlement): moderately to highly aggressive acts used to boost
self-wor th at the expense of the victims. Attackers want to show the victims they
are more skilled than and have author ity over the victims (Casey, 2004).

•

Anger retaliatory: highly aggressive acts, to include sabotage, used to gain
revenge; one of the two most common motives (Mills et al., 2009)

•

Anger excitation (sadistic): highly aggressive, personal act used to gain pleasure
(Mills et al., 2009)

•

Opportunistic: mildly aggressive acts used to achieve satisfaction, often viewed as
having a small chance of being de tected (Mills et al., 2009). This motivation type
aligns with the General Deterrence Theory which states that people base their
decisions on maximizing benefit while minimizing cost (Theoharido u et al.,
2005).

•

Profit oriented: varying in aggressiveness, often coupled with greed (Shaw et al.,
1998) and power reassurance, includes espionage; other most common motive
(Mills et al., 2009)
2.2.6 Organizational Controls
Organizational controls are put into place to help protect an organization from

attacks, from both insiders and outsiders. Ideally these controls deter or prevent an
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attack, but at the very least detect if one has occurred. Organizational controls can be
grouped into one of the following three categories: technical, formal, and informal
(Melara et al., 2003).

Ideally, an organization implements measures from all three

groups.
•

Technical: includes technical monitoring (to include network traffic, e-mail
traffic, and file access), auditing and disabling access paths (Cappe lli et al., 2007),
recovery software, antivirus software, backups (Melara et al., 2003), identification
and authentication procedures, cryptography, discretionary access control,
(Stoneburner et al., 2002)

•

Formal: includes employee intervention,

sanctions (such as demotion,

termination, and decrease in author ity or pr ivilege levels), termination threshold
and time policies (Cappe lli et al., 2007), segregation of security duties, existence
of a separate security department, risk evaluations, policies regarding authority
and pr ivilege levels (Melara et al., 2003)
•

Informal: culture, values, education and training (Melara et al., 2003), warnings
about repercussions (Rich et al., 2005)
It is important to note that controls, such as sanctions, may have the oppos ite

effect of what is intended. If disgruntled employees are repr imanded for unauthorized
activity, they may become even more disgruntled and increasingly likely to commit an
attack. In such a case, it may be wise to supplement the issuing of sanctions with
employee intervention (Cappe lli et al., 2007).
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2.2.7 Organizational Priorities
The priorities of an organization help to form its attitude regarding security. An
organization that highly values profits may not find it financially advantageous to invest a
lot of time and money into security controls. On the other hand, a compa ny who highly
values its reputation and feels it cannot risk a high-profile security incident may spe nd
more money on security measures (Rich, et al., 2005). Furthermore, if an organization
views a certain system as especially vital, it is usually willing to invest more into controls
to protect that system (Mills et al., 2009).

In most cases, insiders are privy to the

compa ny’s stance on security and k now whether or not it wise to attempt an attack.
2.2.8 Organizational Trust
As mentioned earlier, one of the most difficult aspects of the insider threat
problem is that the insider is trusted by the organization. Trust is an element of any
relationship, including those between employees and their managers.

Most research

breaks down trust into components; this research uses those outlined in the research by
Mayer et al. (1995). Put into the context of a work relationship, they are as follows:
•

Ability: one’s skill set and competency in the domain of the task a t hand

•

Benevolence: one’s desire to execute the task well for his manager and the
organization

•

Integrity: one’s set of morals or values and how they align with the manager’s

Initially managers are basing the ir trust in a new employee on calculative trust,
which includes factors such as the employee’s reputation, education, certifications, and
resume (Rousseau et al., 1998). At all times, institutional-based trust plays a role; this
type of trust includes the organization’s controls and mechanisms. For example, initially
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managers trust the new employee since they be lieve the company’s interviewing and
clearance processes are sound. Managers have confidence that the company selected a
qualified person, one who is capable to do the job, has the best interest of the company in
mind, and is moral.

Throughout the relationship, most managers continue to use

clearance renewals, as well as company policies, procedures, and controls, to assist in
reevaluating the employee’s trustworthiness (McKnight et al., 1998). The managers also
base their trust on their own expe riences with and judgments of the employee, known as
relational trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). The type of bus iness an or ganization conducts
most likely affects how initially trusting it is of its employees. Again, this is usually
discernable by the ins iders, a s they see how freely author ity and p rivileges are give n out.
Trust can be a tricky element within an organization, especially in terms of
security. If an organization is very trusting of its employees, it may not invest as much
into security controls. The lack of controls, such as employee on- line monitoring, could
reduce the probability of preventing or detecting malicious insider activities. With little
or no reported incidents, the company may cut back even more on security measures.
Sadly, while incidents may not be detected or reported, they could be occurring just the
same; companies need to be mindful of this “trust trap” (Moore et al., 2008).
2.2.9 Risk Management
The insider threat problem is inherently built on the concept of risk management.
An organization must balance the costs and benefits that are inherent with cyber security.
The most obvious cost is money for the information security personnel and resources. In
an environment in which every employee and network activity could be completely
monitored and analyzed, it might be possible to prevent all attacks.
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Of course, no

organization has the time, money, or personnel to create and maintain such an
environment. Often companies worry most about undetected threats, also called false
negatives, but there is a danger and cost to false positives, or false alarms, as well
(Martinez-Moyano et al., 2008). They can result in e mployees be ing sanctioned for nonmalicious acts or resources being wastefully used to investigate benign events.
In any discussion of risk management there are the following basic elements:
•

Threat-source: entity which intentionally or accidentally

triggers a

vulnerability. As stated earlier, this research is only concerned with malicious
insiders as the source of threats (Elky, 2006).
•

Threat: potential of threat-source to trigger or exploit vulnerability. Examples
of threats include information disclosure, alteration of software, inappropriate
bandwidth usage, denial of service, alteration of data, configuration error, and
telecommunication interruption or malfunction (Elky, 2006).

•

Vulnerability: flaw or weakness in a system within the organization that can
be triggered or exploited. This flaw could be in the design or implementation
of the system, or in the security procedures and controls meant to protect it.
Examples of vulnerabilities include unpatched systems, weak firewall settings,
and policies that do not require the timely termination of employees’ physical
access to company facilities (Stoneburner et al., 2002).

•

Likelihood : probability that a threat will be successfully exercised against a
vulnerability. Often this is measured qualitatively as low, moderate, or high
(Elky, 2006).
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•

Impact: combination of losses in terms of confidentiality, integrity,
availability, as well as effects on mission capability, assets, and human life.
This often measured qualitatively as low, moderate, or high (Elky, 2006).

•

Risk : determined by analyzing the predicted likelihood and impact of the
threat to the vulnerability. Again, this is often measured qualitatively as low,
medium, high, or critical (Figure 2).

The risk management process assists organizations in deciding which threatvulnerability pa irs to address first. Obviously those of high or critical risk are the ones on
which managers should focus. To reduce the risk to a system, a n organization must first

Figure 2. Example Risk Level Matrix (Mills et al., 2009)
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become more aware of its current state, to include its information resources; those
resources’ vulnerabilities; the motivations, skills, knowledge, and resources of its
employees; and the controls it has in place to attempt to prevent attacks. It can estimate
the likelihood of different threat-vulnerability combinations and determine the resulting
impact (Stoneburner et al., 2002). An or ganization is then prepared to work towards
lessening the likelihood, impact, or both. Additional or improved organizational controls
can help to decrease vulnerabilities as well as the impact, such as maintaining back- up or
redundant systems.

2.3 Case Studies
To illustrate how these many individual and organizational factors play into the
insider threat problem, two of the most famous attacks, committed by Robe rt Hanssen
and Timothy Lloyd, are presented below.
Robert Hanssen was an FBI agent who possessed a Top Secret/Sensitive
Compartmented Information clearance and committed espionage for over 15 years.
During this time, he sold thousands of pages of classified doc uments to agents of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and later Russia, to include information on
the United States’ nuclear defense strategy (PERSEREC, 2004) and counterintelligence
tactics (Herbig and Wiskoff, 2002). Hanssen also shared information about the existence
of a tunnel underneath the Russian embassy which the U.S. used to spy on them (Herbig
and Wiskoff, 2002). He also identified three Russian spies who were working for the
FBI, two of whom were later executed (PERSEREC, 2004). Hanssen committed this
espionage by breaking into classified computer files which he had no need to access for
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his legitimate FBI responsibilities. He also used his knowledge of information systems to
access FBI case files in order to monitor any possible investigations the FBI was
conducting on him (PERSEREC, 2004).

In addition to the loss in human lives,

Hanssen’s actions resulted in significant damage to the national security of the United
States.
During his time with the FBI, Rob ert Hanssen could be described as intelligent,
dishonest, and egotistical, as well as a risk-taker. A former co-worker said that despite
his intellect, he did not possess strong social skills and was an introvert (Cooper and
Garvey, 2001). Given the number of years he worked in the FBI, he had ample time to
learn its inner workings. He was also skilled in the realm of information technology and
computer security. Through his various jobs within the FBI, Hanssen gained access to
many FBI case and counterintelligence databases, to include ones owned by the NSA,
CIA, and the State Department (Herbig and Wiskoff, 2002).
Robert Hanssen lived well above his means as a federal employee. He paid for
the down payment and remodeling on his Washington D.C. home in cash, and he sent his
six children to expensive private schools (Havill, 2001b). Despite the supplementary
income from his espionage, Hanssen managed to accumulate a significant amount of
debt, totaling more than $275,000 at one point in time (PERSEREC, 2004). Hanssen also
had an extramarital affair with a stripper, on whom he allegedly spent a sizeable portion
of the money he made from his work with the Russians (PERSEREC, 2004). Rob ert
Hanssen was clearly motivated by profit and greed. It has also been speculated that he
was disgruntled with the FBI, perhaps enticing him to retaliate against the organization
(PERSEREC, 2004). Give n his egotistical nature, he mos t likely enjoyed the thrill of
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being able to commit his illegal acts, especially while working for such a prestigious
organization as the FBI.
Timothy Lloyd worked for the Omega Engineering Corpor ation for 11 years,
making his way up to the position of system administrator.

He was subsequently

demoted and fired from the company, but before he left, he loaded a software “time
bomb” onto the network that was programmed to deploy once he was gone (Melara et al.,
2003). Lloyd worsened the effects by stealing backup tapes and changing a company
policy to centralize the storage of company programs, replacing the former method of
housing them on numerous works tations.

The destruction from the bo mb cost the

company more than $10 million in damages to hardware and software, decreased
productivity, and lost customer revenue (Melara et al., 2003).
Like Hanssen, Lloyd was intelligent, unscrupulous, and egotistical, as well as
instable towards the end of his time with Omega. Lloyd’s expectations were rarely met,
and he seldo m felt he received the recognition he deserved. He was extremely unhappy
when Omega Engineering Corporation expanded and his authority became diluted. After
being demoted, Lloyd began to physically and verbally abuse his co-workers and to
purposefully slow down projects (Melara et al., 2003).
Lloyd had extens ive knowledge of the compa ny’s po licies, structure, and
information systems. He developed much of the network on which Omega depended and
was well aware of its weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

As system administrator, he

created many of the company’s security policies (Melara et al., 2003). Before launching
the software “time bomb”, he caused a number of smaller network incidents aimed at

21

decreasing performance and causing downtime on the network. He was most likely
motivated by his need for revenge and increased self- wor th.

2.4 Insider Threat Models
To better understand the variables that can come into play in the insider threat
prob lem and how they affect each other, p revious insider threat research has modeled this
problem.

This section presents eight models published in previous insider threat

research. These models focus on one or more of the factors discussed earlier in the
chapter. This section also gives a br ief description of logical data and system dynamics
modeling, to include the symbols used and example models.

These two types of

modeling were used in this and previous research.
2.4.1 Voltaire
Laird and Rickard (2005) proposed a system called Voltaire that could be used to
help mitigate insider threat issues by detecting unusual computer use behavior that could
be technical precursors. The first step in the system is to develop a mode l of “normal”
behavior for each user in a given organization, looking at document access, network
usage, and semantic content of documents.

Once these profiles are established, the

insiders are monitored for unusual behavior. The system also looks for inappropriate
behaviors that were present in past insider threat cases. Examples of the dimensions that
the system analyzes are below:
•

Documents Deleted From Database

•

Documents Modified versus Read Ratio

•

Documents Read versus Written Ratio
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•

Documents Printed

•

Printing Other Users’ Documents

•

Different Printers Used

•

Number of Databases Accessed

•

Specific Databases Accessed

•

Latest Work End Time

•

Earliest Work Start Time

2.4.2 Risk Predictor Model
Puleo (2006) developed the “Risk Predictor Model” that examines human
behaviors and outside influences to determine insiders who have a higher potential of
committing a malicious act. The mode l is comprised of the following four components:
•

Influence Matrix: how different influences (such as stress, pay cut,
relationship with family, a nd family financial status) affect one another

•

Event Matrix: how events (such as fina ncial los s, change in physical health,
and recent termination) affect influences

•

Response Vector: how strongly insiders are affected by each influence (For
example, individuals may have a lot of stress, but solid relationships with their
families help them to handle it well.)

•

Stimulus Vector: if an event has occurred in an individual’s life
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Versions of these matrices and vectors are created to represent a typical
employee. These standards can then be used to compare to actual insiders and detect
those who de viate significantly from the average.
2.4.3 Multidiscipline Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat
The “Multidiscipline Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat” (MAMIT) mode l
(see Figure 3) combines numerous factors discussed earlier. It examines the motivations
of the insiders, to include opportunity, as well as observes their behaviors, actions, and
network usage. This model also incorporates elements of risk management, to include
threats and vulnerabilities. The Centralized Analyst or Agent compiles indicators and
produces individual and or ganizational threat levels. The individuals with threat leve ls
that are greater than the acceptable organization threat level are tagged as potential

Figure 3. MAMIT (Butts, 2006)
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malicious parties. Upon identifying a potential threat-source, possible courses of action
are to warn management, increase monitoring of the tagged insider, and lock-out the
insider from network systems. Some actions could be made automatically and based
solely on network activity, while others may necessitate the existence of past behaviors or
job-related incidents and require managerial approval (Butts, 2006).
2.4.4 Logical Data Modeling
Before presenting Tuglular’s (2000) structural approach to insider threat, which is
the inspiration for this research’s first mode l, “Insider Threat Logical Data Model,” this
section provides background information on logical da ta modeling.
2.4.4.1 Background Information on Logical Data Modeling
Logical data modeling, also called entity-relationship (E-R) diagramming,
provides a way to study entities of interest, specific attributes of interest, and the
relationships between entities (Department of Defense, 2007).

For a business

organization, example entities include personnel, resources, policies, and products.
Attributes are used to describe the entities in more detail, such as a person’s name,
position within the company, and security clearance. Relationships are then determined
to depict the associations between entities, such as manager/subordinate and peer/peer
relationships and job functions.

The purpose of logical data modeling is to better

understand the resources of an or ganization, to include what infor mation about them is
important and how they interact with each other. This type of modeling is often done
when designing databases to ensure all the correct information and tables are included
and developed. Figure 4 depicts a very simple logical data model for a real estate
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EMPLOYEE
Employee_ID

SALES OFFICE
Office_ID

Name
Address
Phone_Number
DOB
SSN

Employs

Address
Phone_Number

P

PROPERTY
Property_ID
Manages

Address
Listing_Price

Lists

P Owns
P

OWNER
Owner_ID
Name
Phone_Number

Figure 4. Logical Data Model Example

company.

The level of detail required depends on the nature of the problem being

solved.
Figure 4 shows four different entities: EMPLOYEE, SALES OFFICE,
PROPERTY, and OWNER.

Each entity is a noun—person, place or thing—and has

various attributes used to describe that entity. For example, an EMPLOYEE has an
Employee_ID, as well as a Name, Address, Phone_Number, DOB, and SSN. Usually,
there is a primary key that uniquely identifies a specific member of that entity
class, such as Employee_ID.

The model also shows the relationships between the

entities. Relationships are represented with verb or verb phrase names to show how one
entity interacts with or depends on another. For example, a SALES OFFICE “Employs”
an EMPLOYEE.

Various types of relationships exist, but the ones that are of most

interest here are identifying and non-specific relations hips. An identifying relationship is
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also referred to as a parent-child relationship. In a parent-child relationship, the child
entity cannot exist without the parent, and the pa rent’s primary key(s) (PK) migrates to
the child entity as a foreign key (FK). A single parent may have multiple children, but a
child can have only o ne parent.
A non-specific relationship is one in which “an instance of either entity can be
related to a number of instances of the other entity” (Colombi, 2008). Relationships can
also have cardina lity, which ide ntifies how many of each entity there may be. Figure 5
presents the symbols for the types of relationships and cardinality used in this research’s
mod el.
Identifying Relations hip
Non-specific Relationship
Cardinality of ze ro, one, or more
Cardinality of one or more

P

Cardinality of exactly one

1

Figure 5. Logical Data Model Symbols (Colombi, 2008)

2.4.4.2 Structural Approach to Insider Computer Misuse Incidents
Tuglular’s (2000) structural approach to the insider threat problem focuses on the
following three main entities, which all have many subcomponents:
•

Incident: target (threat realized, value, and control), subject (reason), method,
place, time

•

Response: recognition, trace information, evidence, suspect (profiles,
qualifications, and access authorization)
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•

Consequences: disruption (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), loss
(financial, morale, clients, publicity, and productivity), effect, violation
(policies), result

Tuglular viewed these entities as the foundation from which future insider threat
detection systems could be created. This approach aims to identify potential malicious
insiders by continuous and extensive information collection. By analyzing incidents to a
greater level of detail, he hoped to better prevent future attacks.
2.4.5 System Dynamics Modeling
Before presenting the remaining five insider threat models, this section provides
background information on system dynamics mode ling as it used in all of them. The
final model, “Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem,” was the basis for this
research’s second model, entitled “Insider Threat System Dyna mics Mode l.”
2.4.5.1 Background Information on System Dynamics Modeling
System dynamics mode ling can aid in better unde rstanding a complex problem by
diagramming its variables and how they affect each other over time (Moore et al., 2008).
In the example depicted in Figure 6, the variables include overtime hours required and
work done. Furthermore, arrows represent the relationships between variables, and each
relationship has a source and target. In Figure 6, overtime hours required is the source of
two relationship arrows and the target of one. These relations hips show the influence that
two variables might have on each other. Relations hips show either po sitive or negative
correlation. For the example in Figure 6, there is a negative correlation between fatigue
and quality of work; as fatigue increases, quality of work decreases. Symbology used to
represent these relationships varies. I n Figure 6, a pos itive correlation is shown us ing a
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-

Work to Do

-

quality of work
Reinforcing

+

-

+

Balancing

-

fatigue
+

overtime hours required

work done
+

Figure 6. System Dynamics Modeling Example (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2007)

‘+’ sign, and a negative correlation is indicated by a ‘-’ sign. A positive correlation can
also be depicted by a solid line or letter ‘S’ (for “same”), while a negative correlation can
be indicated by a dashed line, or ‘O’(for “opposite”).
Complex system dynamics models often include feedback loops that are either
balancing or reinforcing; some references refer to these as negative and positive,
respectively (Sterman, 2000).

A balancing loop models a situation where the

relationships between two or more variables lead to a goal state.

Though change is

occurring, the variables are working to establish and maintain an equilibrium condition.
A reinforcing loop is essentially the opposite; the relationships between these variables
are continuously driving the values either upward or downward (Moore et al., 2008). In
Figure 6, the red, pos itive loop is reinforcing as Work to Do is continually increasing. As
the amount of work to do increases, employees are required to work more overtime
hours. If the overtime causes fatigue, the quality of work will actually decrease. This
initiates a vicious cycle because work will have to be reaccomplished, which in turn
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could lead to even more overtime hours. On the other ha nd, if the employees do not
experience fatigue and are successfully able to accomplish high quality work during the
overtime hours, they will have less work to do. This second scenario is a balancing loop
and is depicted by the blue, negative loop in Figure 6.
Sometimes “stock and flow” symbols are used in system dynamics modeling to
represent the levels and rates of variables in a problem. A stock represents a level of a
variable in the problem, and it can have both an inflow and an outflow. The inflow comes
from a source and outflow goes into a sink. Figure 7 illustrates these stock and flow
components.

Figure 7. Stock and Flow Symbols (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2007)

Figure 8 illustrates a simple example which mode ls rabbit population, taking into
consideration factors such as birth rate and life expectancy.

Figure 8. Stock and Flow Example (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2007)
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2.4.5.2 Insider Attack on an Information System
One method for analyzing the insider threat problem is to model one specific case
study. In the “System Dynamic of Insider Attack on an Information System” (see Figure
9) developed by Melara, et al. (2003), the authors analyzed the case study of Timothy
Lloyd’s attack at the Omega Engineering Corporation. Melara, et al. (2003) focused on
Lloyd’s precursory incidents and aggressive acts, which they felt both stemmed from his
discontent and disgruntlement with the company. Since Lloyd’s technical precursors
were primarily causing downtime on the information systems, downtime was a primary
variable, analyzed in terms of impact and recovery. The model also looked at Omega
Engineering’s commitment to security (or lack thereof), its formal controls, and its
decision to fire Lloyd.
Once created and validated, the model was tested by analyzing how variables
such as management perception of technical security, technical security reduction, and
technical security level are affected over time by varying levels of formal controls
(ranging from “no” to “high”). In all three cases the implementation of high formal
controls resulted in positive effects for the organization, to include increased management
perception of technical security, decreased reduction in security by insider, and increased
technical security level (Melara et al., 2003).
2.4.5.3 Insider IT Sabotage Model
The CMU CERT technical staff has developed many system dynamics models,
including the “Insider IT Sabotage Model” (see Figure 10) (Band et al., 2006). This
model contains attributes of the insider, to include disgruntlement, predispos itions, stress,
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Figure 9. Model of Insider Attack on an Information System (Melara et al., 2003)
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and expectation. It also focuses on both the behavioral and technical indicators that can
be monitored and audited. In addition, the model takes into account how an organization
might react to such events, through such channels as employee intervention or sanctions.
The access paths known and unknown to the organization are also very important
elements.
This model also includes balancing and reinforcing loops (described in Figure
11). One example of a balancing loop (labeled ‘B3’ in Figures 10 and 11) refers to
precursory events decreasing because of the issuing of sanctions, which had increased an
insider’s perceived risk of being caught. As mentioned previously, issuing sanctions can
also have an opposite effect. The disgruntlement sanctioning escalation loop shows the
spiraling effect of this reinforcing loop (labeled ‘ R5’ in Figures 10 and 11). An employee
who receives sanctions may become more stressed and disgruntled, which in turn could
lead to more precursory events.
2.4.5.4 Espionage Model
The CMU CERT technical staff also developed a system dynamics mod el ent itled
“Espionage Model" to look at the variables and relationships present in the espionage
compo nent of the insider threat problem (see Figure 12) (Band, et al., 2006). This model
also included many factors related to the insider, to include personal needs, disposition,
stress, and willingne ss to commit espionage.

Financial needs and greed were very

prominent factors as well. On the organizational side, there were variables concerning
monitoring and auditing, access paths, discovering of espionage, trust, sanctions, security
procedures and awareness training, and culture of reporting suspicious behavior. The
model also included influence from the outside in terms of external forces eliciting spies.
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Figure 10. Insider IT Sabotage Model (Band et al., 2006)
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Figure 11. Model Feedback Loops (Band et al., 2006)
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Figure 12. Espionage Model (Band et al., 2006)

This model includes the same feedback loops as the Insider IT Sabotage Model
(explained in Figure 11).
2.4.5.5 Abstracted Common Model
The CMU CERT technical staff was asked by one of its sponsors, the Defense
Personnel Security Research Center, to examine commonalities between the sabo tage and
espionage categories of insider threat. After creating the Insider IT Sabotage Model and
Espionage Model discussed above, the CMU CERT technical staff developed the
Abstracted Common Model (see Figure 13).

By analyzing case studies from both

subcategories, the staff found the six significant commonalties listed below (Band et al.,
2006):
1. Malicious insiders had common personal predispositions that led them to
commit sabotage or espionage, such as mental health disorders, alcoholism,
personality problems (e.g., anger, sense of entitlement, egotism), poor social
and decision- making skills, and history of rule conflicts.

These personal

dispos itions resulted in personal needs which in turn led to harmful actions
against the organization, motivated by disgruntlement, profit, or opportunity.
2. Often the malicious inside rs were affected by stressful events, such as
organizational sanctions (to include termination or suspension) and personal
events. Furthermore, the insiders’ personal predispositions affected how they
handled the stressful events. For example, people prone to feeling angry are
more likely to become increasingly disgruntled after being issued sanctions.
This disgruntlement can lead them to commit additional acts, which may only
lead to further sanctions.
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3. The malicious insiders exhibited unusual and troublesome be haviors before
and during the malicious acts. Examples of these behaviors include being
tardy or late for work, arguing with co-workers, performing poorly at their
job, violating security policies and procedures, and voicing grievances with or
desire to cause harm to the organization.
4. In both subcategories, the malicious insiders conducted technical precursory
incidents.

Types of incidents include creating unauthorized access paths,

accessing documents which they do not need for their job responsibilities,
excessive printing or copying of documents, and creating and testing logic
bombs.

Whether the organizations detected these pr ecursory events was

largely due to the level of monitoring and auditing they conducted.
5. The organizations either did not detect or ignored rule violations, whether
technical or behavioral. On the technical side, often precursor y events were
not detected. If the y were and sanctions were issued, the malicious insiders
many times just did a better job of concealing future incidents.

On the

behavioral side, often the rule violations were dismissed or ignored, which
often emboldened the insiders to continue with such behavior.
6. A deficiency in access controls, either electronic or physical access to
resources, helped the malicious insiders to achieve their goal. In some cases,
the insiders were given more access than necessary for their job or access was
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not decreased once they had been demoted. The organization also may not
have practiced the security policies of least privilege and separation of duty.
The Abstracted Common Mode l also contains the same five balancing and five
reinforcing loops as the Insider IT Sabotage Model and Espionage Model (Figure 11).
S
Insider
Access
S

S
B2

O
Behavioral & S
Enforcing Authorization
Level
Using
Access
Technical
Indicators
S
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Personal
Control
or
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Discovering
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Figure 13. Abstracted Common Mode l (Band et al., 2006)
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2.4.5.6 Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem
From their development of materials for insider threat workshops and talks they
have given at conf erences, the CMU CERT technic al staff received feedback regarding
their system dynamics models. From that feedback, they developed an abstract Model of
the Insider IT Sabotage Problem that is more understandable to those who are unfamiliar
with system dynamics modeling (Moore et al., 2008) (see Figure 14). They retained the
core elements, such as personal disposition, expectation, event, disgruntlement,
monitoring, precursors, sanctions, trust, and access paths, but removed some of the
smaller, more detailed variables (such as audit qua lity and technical freedom given to
insider). As well, they retained five of the balancing (labeled with a ‘B’) and reinforcing
loops (labeled with an ‘R’), which are as follows: expectation escalation (R1), escalation
of disgruntlement (R2), unobserved emboldening of insider (R3), trust trap (R4), and
intended effects of sanctions (B1).

2.5 Summary
This chapter examined the variables that previous research has identified in the
insider threat problem, to include those attributed to the insider and to the organization.
To further explain these and see how they can come into play, the attacks performed by
Robert Hanssen and Timothy Lloyd were described. Additionally, insider threat models
from previous research were presented to depict the relationships among these variables.
In order to better understand these models and those developed for this research,
background information was included on logical data and system dynamics modeling.
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Figure 14. Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem (Moore et al., 2008)

In the next chapter, the logical data and system dynamics mode ls created for this
research are presented. There is also a discussion of why the CMU CERT technical
staff’s Abstracted Common Model was chosen as the most relevant to the USAF and
therefore used as the basis for the mode l to be used in the po licy review. Lastly, the
chapter will explain the additional variables that were incorporated, resulting in this
research’s Insider Threat Mode l for Sabotage and Espionage.
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III. Inside r Threat Modeling

3.1 Overview
To ensure the most appropriate model was used for the review of USAF policy,
this research first mode led the problem as a way to tie the many variables together. In
this chapter, the logical data and system dynamics mode ls that were first developed for
this research are described in detail, to include the models’ entities, attributes,
relationships, and feedback loops. Afterwards, there is an explanation of why the CMU
CERT technical staff’s Abstracted Common Mode l was selected as the basis for this
research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.

The reasoning behind

incorporating motivations, organizational priorities, and social networks is also presented.

3.2 Logical Data Model
To better understand the insider threat problem, variables from the various insider
threat models were incorporated into this research’s Insider Threat Logical Data Model.
The attributes of the entities were listed out, as well as the relationships between the
entities. These entities were then tied together with the risk assessment elements (threat,
vulnerability, likelihood, impact, and risk). By examining their organizations through t he
lens of this model, managers can identify what elements in their organization may be
putting them at risk of an insider attack. Hopefully, they can then work to decrease the
vulnerabilities, threats, or both. As mentioned in the last chapter, this mode l was inspired
by Tuglular’s (2000) structural approach which outlined the elements and attributes
which play a role in an insider attack.
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To make the model easier to read, Figure 15 includes all the entities and
relationships but excludes the attributes.

The entities in the yellow-highlighted area

(Area 1) are attributed to the insider, and those in the green-highlighted are related to the
organization (Area 2).

The risk management entities are shaded in magenta (Area 3).

Figures 16 through 20 depict portions of the model with all attributes and keys for the
included entities.
3.2.1 Entities of the Insider Threat Logical Data Model
This next section outlines each of the entities included in the Insider Threat
Logical Data Mode l to include their attributes.
3.2.1.1 Organization
There are elements of the organization itself that can play a role in determining
whether it is at risk of an insider attack (see Figures 15 and 16). These include the type
of bus iness with which the organization is invo lved (e.g., military, education, or customer
service), what it considers its priorities (e.g., reputation or profits) (Rich et al., 2005), a nd
its propensity to trust its employees (McKnight et al., 1998).
3.2.1.2 Control
The controls an organization chooses to implement to detect and protect it from
insider attacks are also important entities to examine (see Figures 15, 16, and 19). These
controls usually fall into one of the following three categories: technical, formal, or
informal (Melara et al., 2003); most likely an organization implements controls from all
three categories. The type of control can vary from monitoring (technical) to issuing
sanctions (formal) (Cappelli et al., 2007) to organizational culture (informal) (Melara et
al., 2003).
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Figure 16. Organization and Related Entities

3.2.1.3 System
Having an inve ntory of the organization’s systems is an important element in
mitigating any type of security risk (Pipkin, 2000) (see Figures 15, 16, and 19). The
organization needs to know what resources it has, as well as prioritize them based on
their value to the company. A system’s priority can help an organization determine how
much money and time it is willing to invest in order to protect it.
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Figure 17. Insider and Profile Entities

3.2.1.4 Insider
The people potentially responsible for insider attacks must be tracked (see Figures
15 through 19). Basic information includes name, social security number, job title, date
of employment, date of termination, and insider type (current or former employee,
service providers, consultants, or contractors) (CSO, 2007).
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3.2.1.5 Psychological Profile
As much as possible, it is beneficial to have a psychological profile on all insiders
(see Figures 15 and 17).

Obviously, this is more difficult for service providers,

consultants, or contractors, but some personality traits and behaviors may be exhibited as
insiders work with the organization. Though there does not exist a profile for malicious
insiders, the following traits and behaviors have historically been possessed or exhibited
by malicious insiders: egotism, instability, malice, passion, dishonesty, risk taking, lack
of self control, lack of strength of character, poor social skills, addictions, (Tuglular,
2000), acting out of character, making alarming statements (Puleo, 2006), resistance to
change (Robbins and Judge, 2008), and unordinary sexual behavior (Under Secretary for
Management, 2006).
3.2.1.6 Legal Profile
It is beneficial to know the criminal record of all insiders, to include previous
offenses (see Figures 15 and 17). Individuals who have broken the law in the past may
be more inclined to do so again (Under Secretary for Management, 2006).
3.2.1.7 Computer Use Profile
It is important to understand the typical computer usage patterns of each insider,
to include the following: password failure pattern (Tuglular, 2000), documents read
versus written ratio, documents printed, printing other users’ documents, number of
databases accessed, latest work end time, and earliest work start time (Laird and Rickard,
2005) (see Figures 15 and 17). If while monitoring insiders, it is discovered that they are
suddenly participating in activities that do not fit their normal pattern, the organization
should be concerned and look into the situation. It is also important to know of any
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special activities, such as high usage of the file transfer protocol (FTP) or access to
unusual websites, which they legitimately need for their job. Awareness of these unique
activities can help prevent the organization from examining false positives. It is essential
to know what pr ivilege level the insiders have on the network and what resources they
can access (Cappelli et al., 2007).
3.2.1.8 Social Profile
It is beneficial to have insight into each insider’s personal life (see Figures 15 and
17). Once a baseline is established, an organization should be on the lookout for any
changes, such as withdrawal from usua l hobb ies or soc ial groups, as they can be signs of
the occurrence of a stressful event, such as a divorce. The recommended attributes to
track are marital status, number of dependents, relationship with family, memberships,
hobbies, and community involvement (Tuglular, 2000).
3.2.1.9 Economic Profile
Historically, economic factors have played a major role in motivating insiders to
commit malicious acts (Tuglular, 2000) (see Figures 15 and 17).

In terms of sabotage,

insiders may feel they have not received the promotion or raise that they think they
deserve. Individuals who are in financial trouble are more likely to find espionage an
attractive option. Attributes of this entity include insiders’ suspicious financial activity
and financial stability or secur ity.
3.2.1.10 Ideological Profile
It is also important to have insight into insiders’ roles in religion and politics
(Tuglular, 2000) (see Figures 15 and 17).

Similar to the Social Profile entity, it is

valuable to establish baselines and then watch for any changes, such as an individual’s
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sudden withdrawal from or new membership in a church. Involvement in a new religious
or political organization could also have social or economic effects.
3.2.1.11 Professional Profile
Insiders’ feelings towards and behavior in the workplace are also important
factors in the insider threat problem (see Figures 15 and 17). Again, some of these
attributes may be kept internally by the insiders, though others could be expressed to coworkers or supervisors.

To capture an accurate picture of an insider, the following

factors should be identified: job satisfaction, organizational commitment, job
involvement (Robbins and Judge, 2008), job security, job performance (e.g., absenteeism
and not able to meet deadlines or handle appropriate workload) (Puleo, 2006),
professional knowledge, professional skills, and intelligence (Tuglular, 2000).
3.2.1.12 Event
Events such as change in marital status or demotion can often be triggers for
deviant behavior in the workplace (see Figures 15 and 18).

The events can either

increase the insiders’ stress or decrease their expectation fulfillment. Both of these can
lead to an increase in insiders’ pe rsonal needs, which can in turn bring about additional
harmful actions (Band et al., 2006).

The event can be nationwide (e.g., recession),

organization-wide (e.g., restructuring, mergers, personnel cuts, or relocation), or at an
individual level (e.g., death in the family, health issues, or change in supervisor)
(Cappe lli et al., 2007).
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Figure 18. Insider and Related Entities

3.2.1.13 Relationship
Insiders’ social ties within the organization can either lead to or prevent them
from participation in deviant behavior (see Figures 15 and 18). If insiders have strong
ties with co-workers, they are more reluctant to commit deviant behavior in the
workplace that could jeopardize these relationships. On the other hand, if insiders are in
relationships with others who are committing malicious acts, they may be more inclined
to follow suit (Theoharidou et al., 2005).
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3.2.1.14 Motivation
All malicious insiders are motivated by something (see Figures 15, 18, and 19).
Common motives in criminal behavior are money and revenge (Casey, 2004).
Similar to psychological characteristics, insiders’ motivations may not be evident to
anyone else. If they do divulge information regarding the nature of their motivation, then
it should be recorded.

51

3.2.1.15 Incident
If a technical incident does occur, many details should be investigated and
recorded, especially since it may be a precursor to a larger, more damaging attack. The
organization should try to de termine the nature of the incide nt (intentional destruction,
detrimental misuse, dangerous tinkering, or naive mistake) (see Figures 15 and 19). It is
important to note that acts that seem harmless could be malicious insiders’ attempts to
test the security controls (Stanton, et al., 2005). A description of each incident should be
recorded (for example, accessing unauthorized websites, installing unauthorized
software, or creating covert channels) (Mills et al., 2009). Additionally, it would be
beneficial to know where the insider got the idea for the attack, (e.g., from Internet
research or another employee), as well as the target, method, date, time, and place (e.g.,
at work or via virtual private network [VPN]) (Tuglular, 2000).
3.2.1.16 Threat
A threat is the potential of a threat-source (in this case a malicious insider) to
trigger or exploit a vulnerability (see Figures 15, 19, and 20).
information disclosure and alteration of software.

Examples include

Identifying potential threats is an

important step in the risk management process; this activity should be completed by all
organizations (Stoneburner et al., 2002).
3.2.1.17 Vulnerability
A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system within the organization that can
be triggered or exploited (see Figures 15, 19, and 20). Just as an organization needs to
identify potential threats, it should also determine what its vulnerabilities are, especially
since this is what adversaries do in order to increase their likelihood of success. Examples
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of vulnerabilities include unpatched systems and terminated employees still having
access to company resources (Stoneburner et al., 2002).
3.2.1.18 Likelihood
In risk management, likelihood is the probability that a threat will be successfully
exercised against a vulnerability (see Figures 15 and 20). For each threat-vulnerability
pair, an organization should determine if they think the likelihood is low, moderate, or
high (Elky, 2006).
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3.2.1.19 Impact
In risk management, the impact of a threat-vulnerability pair is usually the
combination of losses in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, as well as effects
on mission capability, assets, and human life (see Figures 15 and 20). Organizations
must determine for their particular organization what the predicted impact will be,
usually using the categories of low, moderate, or high (Elky, 2006).
3.2.1.20 Risk
Risk is determined by analyzing the predicted likelihood and impact of the threat
exercising the vulnerability (see Figures 15 and 20).

Usually this is measured

qualitatively as low, medium, high, or critical. The risk management process assists
organizations in deciding which threat-vulnerability pairs to address first (Mills et al.,
2009).
3.2.2 Relationships in the Insider Threat Logical Data Model
This section outline s the relationships include d in the Insider Threat Logical Data
Model (see Figure 15).
•

An Organization enacts Controls.
The management of the organization is responsible for developing, enacting, and
enforcing the controls (see Figure 16).

•

An Organization owns Systems.
The or ganization owns the systems and the infor mation in them, and therefore, it
is responsible for protecting those systems (see Figure 16).
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•

An Organization employs Insiders.
The management of the organization is the responsible for hiring, monitoring,
evaluating, disciplining, promoting, and terminating employees (see Figure 16).

•

An Insider is the subject of a Control.
Controls can be directed at particular insiders, for example system administrators.
Additionally, if an insider is issued a sanction, that individual is the subject of the
control (see Figure 16).

•

An Insider is illustrated by a Psychological Profile.
Each insider has a one psychological profile, which may be unique within the
organization (see Figure 17).

•

An Insider is illustrated by a Legal Profile.
Each insider has a one legal profile, which may be unique within the organization
(see Figure 17).

•

An Insider is illustrated by a Computer Use Profile.
Each insider has a one computer use profile, which may be unique within the
organization (see Figure 17).

•

An Insider is illustrated by a Social Profile.
Each insider has a one social profile, which may be unique within the
organization (see Figure 17).

•

An Insider is illustrated by an Economic Profile.
Each insider has a one economic profile, which may be unique within the
organization (see Figure 17).
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•

An Insider is illustrated by an Ideological Profile.
Each ins ide r has a one ideological profile, which may be unique within the
organization (see Figure 17).

•

An Insider is illustrated by a Professional Profile.
Each insider has a one professional profile, which may be unique within the
organization (see Figure 17).

•

An Insider is involved in Relationships.
Insiders are involved in a relationship with their supervisors.

They may be

involved in many other relationships with co-workers as well (see Figure 18).
•

An Event happens to an Insider.
Insiders are positively or negatively affected by nationw ide, organization-wide,
and individual- level events (see Figure 18).

•

An Insider is driven by Motivations.
Insiders commit malicious acts due to at least one of the various motivational
factors (see Figure 18).

•

A System contains a Vulnerability.
An individual system may have one or more vulnerabilities.

Also, a single

vulnerability can be present in and affect multiple systems or pos sibly the
organization as a whole (see Figure 19).
•

An Insider is the source of a Threat.
Within this discussion of insider threat, all the threat-sources are insiders (see
Figure 19).
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•

A Technical Incident results from a Motivation.
Insiders have at least one source of motivation for committing a technical incident
(see Figure 19).

•

A Vulnerability is exploited in a Technical Incident.
A technical incident is the pairing of a threat to a vulnerability (see Figure 19).

•

A Threat is realized in a Technical Incident.
A technical incident is the pairing of a threat to a vulnerability (see Figure 19).

•

A Control is a result of a Technical Incident.
A control may be introduced into the organization after the occurrence of an
incident, whether it is new company-wide policy or a sanction issued to the
insider who was the source (see Figure 19).

•

A Threat and Vulnerability have a Likelihood.
A threat-vulnerability pair has a resulting likelihood (see Figure 20).

•

A Threat and Vulnerability have an Impact.
A threat-vulnerability pair has a resulting impact (see Figure 20).

•

A Likelihood and Impact have a Risk value.
A likelihood- impact pair has a risk value (see Figure 20).

3.3 System Dynamics Model
Once the logical data model was completed, a system dyna mics mode l was
developed to explain how these entities affected each other (i.e., positively or negatively)
and ultimately how they may increase or decrease a system’s level of risk in terms of the
insider threat problem. As mentioned in the last chapter, this research’s Insider Threat
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System Dynamics Mode l (see Figure 21) was greatly inspired by the CMU CERT
technical staff’s abstract Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem (Moore et al., 2008).
This model was chosen as it included more of the entities and attributes included in the
Insider Threat Logical Data Model than any of the other mode ls, such as personal
characteristics, organizational controls, trust, and events. Many of the variables in the
Ins ider Threat System Dynamics Mode l were purposefully named to provide consistency
with the CMU model.
This next section describes the two variables at the heart of this mode l,
Organizational Controls and Insider's Motivation to Commit Malicious Act, to include
the interactions they have with each other as well as their relationships with the mode l’s
other variables. The incorporation of the risk management variables and the feedback
loops within the model are also explained. This model uses a ‘+’ sign for relationships
with a pos itive correlation and ‘-’ for those with a negative cor relation.
3.3.1

Organizational Controls

An organization’s priorities play a role in how much it invests in controls, such as
monitoring and training. An organization that prioritizes reputations often invests more,
while one that prioritizes profits invests less (Rich et al., 2005). If the organization
prioritizes a particular system, it usually spe nds more to protect it (Mills et al., 2009). If
an organization has a low amount of trust in its employees, it often spe nds mor e money
on controls as it feels an attack is likely. Similarly, if an organization begins to discover
precursory incidents, it most likely increases controls, for example additional monitoring
or issuing of sanctions (Moore et al., 2008).
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3.3.2

Insider’s Motivation to Commit Malicious Act

Insiders’ motivation to commit a malicious act can be increased by relationships
with co-workers who are also committing such acts. These co-workers can serve as poor
role models. On the other hand, relationships with co-workers who are not themselves
committing malicious acts can decrease the motivation of insiders, as they would not
want to jeopa rdize these relationships (Theoharidou et al., 2005). Negative events, such
as change in marital status, could also increase insiders’ motivation to attack (Puleo,
2006). A negative event can also lead to a decrease in insiders’ expectation fulfillment,
which increases their unmet expectation level and subsequently their motivation to act
(Moore et al., 2008).
Insider precursors, in terms of legal, professional, and psychological traits and
behaviors, can also increase insiders’ motivation. For example, insiders who have had
legal problems in the past, are egotistical, feel they deserve promotions (Tuglular, 2000),
and are dissatisfied with their jobs (Puleo, 2006) could be more motivated to attack their
company. The psychological disposition of insiders may also lead them to have naturally
higher expectations of the access and recognition they should receive at work.

As

mentioned earlier, if expectations are not met, their motivation to attack can be increased
(Moore et al., 2008).
3.3.3

Relationships Between Insider’s Motivation
Controls

and Organizational

Organizational controls can have two very different affects on ins ide rs’
motivation to act maliciously. If there are many controls in place to monitor and audit
employee activity, then the risk adversity of insiders often is increased, which in turn
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decreases their motivation to act as they feel that the likelihood of being detected is
greater. On the other hand, if upset employees are issued sanctions (an increase in
organizational controls), they may simply become more disgruntled and more likely to
act (Cappelli and Moore, 2008).
3.3.4 Incorporation of Risk Management
In risk management, as either the number of threats or vulnerabilities to a system
increase so does the likelihood of an attack to that system. As either the likelihood or
impact of an attack to a system increases so does the risk to that system. Since the threats
come from insiders, as their motivation increases so does the threat level.

Since

organizational controls are enacted to protect the systems, as the number of controls
increases, the number of vulnerabilities should decrease. Additionally, if an organization
recognized that a particular system had a high risk level, it would likely increase the
number of controls in place to protect that system.
3.3.5 Feedback Loops
To align with the Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem (Moore et al., 2008),
the model in this paper incorporated the same feedback loops, described next.
•

Expectation Escalation (labe led R1- shown in red on the mode l)
If insiders ha ve their expectations fulfilled, then often that simply raises
the ir level of expectation for the future. This is a reinforcing loop that could
spiral out of control.

•

Escalation of Disgruntlement (labeled R2- shown in pink o n the mode l)
If insiders are committing precursory technical incidents or displaying
unusual behavior, these are either discovered or go undetected. If precursors are
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discovered, then organizational controls, such as monitoring and the issuing of
sanctions, are increased. This increase of organizational controls can increase the
insiders’ disgruntlement. In turn, this can increase their motivation to commit an
act and lead to more precursory incidents or behaviors. Again this is a reinforcing
loop which can continuously escalate.
•

Intended Effects of Sanctions (labeled B1- shown in black o n the mode l)
The issuing of sanctions and increase of other organizational controls can
have a very different effect on insiders. If these controls increase insiders’ risk
adversity, they may actually become less motivated to attack since they feel it is
likely that they will be detected again. This decrease in motivation can actually
lessen the number of future precursory incidents or behaviors. This is a balancing
loop which works towards reaching the goal state of no or few precursors.

•

Unobserved Emboldening of Insider (labeled R3- shown in green on the mode l)
If precursors go undetected, the insiders’ risk adversity is lowered and
the ir motivation to act again is increased as they feel they could get away with
malicious activity. This often leads to additional acts. This is a reinforcing loop;
if the insiders’ actions continue to go undetected, they will continue to act.

•

Trust Trap (labeled R4- shown in orange on the model)
If an organization has low trust in its employees, it usually invests more in
controls, such as monitoring and auditing.

With more controls in place, the

likelihood of an incident being detected is greater.

As more incidents are

detected, the organization’s trust lowers even more, leading to additional controls.
This is another reinforcing loop.
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3.4 Selection of the Abstracted Common Model
After the development of the logical data and system dynamics models, the final
step before conducting the review of the USAF policies was to develop the model that
would be used for comparison. It was decided that first a previously published model
would be selected as the basis. From the review of the models described in Chapter II,
the Abstracted Common Mode l was chosen as the most relevant and understandable for
the audience of USAF leaders and supervisors. Both insider espionage and sabo tage are
concerns of the USAF; therefore, a model that focuses on the commonalties of these two
problem areas is ideal. Mitigating insider threat is a difficult and still fairly new problem.
Measures that can help prevent two types of insider threat are therefore very attractive as
they guide organizations as they begin to invest in fighting against the problem (Cappe lli
and Moore, 2008). In addition, the fact that this model is abstract makes it easier to
decipher for those who are not necessarily information technology or system dynamics
experts. Also, the CMU CERT technical staff focused on describing the balancing and
reinforcing feedback loops as they found those to be of utmost interest to business
managers (Cappelli and Moore, 2008).
To ensure that all the variables were incorporated, the Insider Threat Logical Data
Model and the Insider Threat System Dynamics Model were compared with the
Abstracted Common Model. Three areas of focus in this research’s models were not
completely addressed and were therefore incorporated. The resulting mod el, the Insider
Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage Model, was then used during the policy
review.
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3.5 Modification of the Abstracted Common Model
The three areas of the insider threat problem that were covered in this research’s
models but not, or not fully, in the Abstracted Common Model were motivations,
organizational priorities, and social networks. The incorporation of these variables into
this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage (see Figure 22) is
explained in the next sections. The importance of these factors in the insider threat
problem is explained, as well as their specific relevance to the USAF. These variables
were integrated to enhance the comprehensiveness of the policy review.
3.5.1

Insider Motivations

While the Abstracted Common Mode l does not include an Insider Motivation
variable, its variable Personal Needs (highlighted in yellow in Figure 22) embodies this
factor of the insider threat problem. The paper “Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and
Espionage: A Model- Based Analysis,” (Band et al., 2006) from which the Abstracted
Common Model comes, has some discussion about this connection of motivations to
needs, but there can be a more robust relationship explained between these two, using
Casey’s (2004) six types of motives.
•

Power reassurance is the need to boost one’s self-confidence. For example, the
ins ide rs may feel the need to prove to themselves that they can successfully
accomplish the act at hand (Mills et al., 2009).

•

Power assertive is the need for recognition, usually to boost one’s self-worth
(Shaw et al., 1998).

•

Anger retaliatory is the need for revenge (Mills et al., 2009).
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•

Anger excitation is the need to gain pleasure from causing harm to the
organization and its members (Mills et al., 2009).

•

Opportunistic is the need to achieve satisfaction (Mills et al., 2009).

•

Profit is the need for money (Shaw et al., 1998).

In order to detect which insiders may potentially be malicious, it is important for
an organization to comprehend why they would decide to attack. The USAF conducts
background investigations on its employees to determine their security clearance level.
An investigator discovering an individual has financial prob lems is a concern as it could
indicate this individual is susceptible to adversaries approaching him to commit
espionage (Under Secretary for Management, 2006). Additionally, the USAF recently
went through a period of reductions in force. There are many documented cases of
terminated employees becoming disgruntled and plotting revenge on their organizations
(McMillan, 2009). If stressful or unfavorable events occur, it is important to understand
how they can affect a person’s motivation and likelihood to attack.
3.5.2

Organizational Priorities

Another concept that was not included in the Abstracted Common Model was that
of organizational priorities and how they affect organizational controls and spending
(Rich et al., 2005). An organization that highly prioritizes profits may be less likely to
invest money into information technology security. Often this results from the fact that
the return on investment with preventive measures can be extremely hard to calculate.
An or ganization may not even know whether an implemented measure is deterring

65

S
S

Insider
Access

S
B5
Enforcing Authorization
Level Using Access
Control
S
O
O
B2
Organization's
Organization's
Prioritization of
S
Prioritization of
Profit S
Reputation
Behavioral & Technical
O
Indicators or Violations
O
S
S
Personal
(Actual)
S
Auditing and Detecting Concerning
Predispositions
Monitoring Behavior and Technical
S
Discovering
B3 O S
S
Unauthorized
S Actions
Access
Concealing
S
Personal
O
Insider's
O
O Needs
O Rule
S
Perceived
Risk Harmful
Violations
R3 Organization's
Sanctions
Actions
Trust of Insider
S
B4
R4
Positive Relationships
O
S S Sanctioning Relative S
with Co-Workers S
R2
Organization
to Insider Actions
Discovering
Perceived Risk
Harmful Actions
S
B1
Negative
S
Stressful
Relationships with
R5
S
S
Event
Co-Workers
S
Insider Stress S
O
S
Fulfilling
R1
Personal Needs
Amplifying
Personal Need

Figure 22. Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage

attacks. On the other hand, a company who highly values its reputation may be more
inclined to invest in security measures, as it cannot afford a publicized security breach
(Rich et al., 2005). By incorpo rating these variables into the mode l, an or ganization can
assess how its stance on profits versus reputation can affect its likelihood of detecting,
deterring, and preventing malicious attacks. It is also important to note that insiders are
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usually pr ivy to the compa ny’s stance on secur ity and know how wise it is to attempt an
attack.
This issue of prioritization is a difficult one of the USAF. As a responsible
steward of its Congressional budget the USAF must make wise investments in security
measures. On the other hand, the USAF is responsible for protecting vital information
and information systems related to national security and therefore aims for robust
security. Determining the appropriate balance is a challenge and can have affects on
mitigating threats from malicious insiders.
To incorporate these concepts into the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and
Espionage two additional variables were created (highlighted in green in Figure 22). The
variable Organization's Prioritization of Profit is negatively correlated with Auditing and
Monitoring given that an organization which prioritizes profits does not invest as much in
monitoring and auditing its employees.

This results in fewer harmful actions being

discovered. It also does not spend as much money in training its employees which can
lead to employees not discovering unusual or malicious behavioral or technical incidents.
Therefore, it is also negatively correlated with the variable and Detecting Concerning
Behavior and Technical Actions. The second new variable Organization's Prioritization
of Reputation will be positively correlated with both Auditing and Monitoring and
Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions as this type of organization is
willing to invest the money in training, monitoring, and auditing, which increases its
likelihood of detecting behavioral and technical precursors.
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3.5.3

Social Networks

Though the CMU CERT technical staff members are look ing to integrate social
networks into future mode ls, they have not yet (Cappelli and Moore, 2008). As discussed
earlier, insiders can be affected either negatively or positively by relationships with their
co-workers. Having relationships with upstanding co-workers may deter insiders from
doing harm to the organization as they do not wish to risk these relations hips, either by
the ir co-workers’ disapproving of their actions or the company firing them. This is due to
the Social Bond Theory (Theoharidou et al., 2005). For example, past research has
shown a strong negative correlation between co-worker satisfaction and unexcused
absenteeism. The researcher theorized that the employees did not want to jeopardize the
professional relationships they had made by exhibiting deviant behavior (Blau, 1985).
Additionally, insiders with strong ties within the organization may not want to br ing harm
to their co-workers in terms of loss in revenue, unrenewed contracts, and tarnished
reputation, which can all result from a successful attack (Theoharidou et al., 2005).
Strong relationship ties in the workplace ha ve been shown to have other pos itive
effects, like a sense of community, better communication, and enhanced understanding of
the mission of other areas of the organization. The “Rule of 150” describes the supported
theory that organizational units with more than 150 members are too large to benefit from
many of these positive effects of social networks as the relationships do not develop. In
large organizations, employees can feel insignificant and not part of a cohesive team
(Gladwell, 2002).
By examining the two case studies discussed in this research, it is evident that
neither Robe rt Hanssen nor Timothy Lloyd had s trong soc ial ties that they were
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concerned about breaking. Hanssen was an introvert with poor social skills (Cooper and
Garvey, 2001). He did not relate well with co-workers; there are reports of him sexually
harassing and physically assaulting FBI co-workers (Havill, 2001a; Havill, 2001b). He
also reprimanded their social behavior and hacked into their computers just for enjoyment
(Havill, 2001b). Dur ing the end o f his time with Omega, Lloyd lashed o ut at and tried to
sabotage co-workers (Melara et al., 2003).
Per the Soc ial Learning Theor y, having relationships with co-workers who
themselves are committing malicious acts or planning to do so may actually increase the
insiders’ likelihood of participating in deviant behavior (Theoharidou et al., 2005). The
insiders may look at these other individuals as role models or people they wish to
impress. The likelihood of such an individual following suit is increased if these deviant
co-workers are not being detected or disciplined.
As organizations are designed or restructured, the effects of social networks is
important to keep in mind for various reasons, from morale to performance. The USAF
strongly promotes teamwork within its organizations which could benefit the USAF in
terms of the insider threat problem. There is a concern though regarding how frequently
active duty members change units and even bases. It is important to ensure they become
part of the team when arriving at a new workplace.
These two concepts are incorporated into the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage
and Espionage (highlighted in magenta in Figure 22) by including two variables, each of
which has an effect on Personal Needs. The first new variable Positive Relationships
with Co-Workers has a negative correlation with Personal Needs, given that those healthy
relationships should decrease insiders’ need or desire to commit harmful actions. The
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second variable Negative Relationships with Co-Workers should have pos itive
correlations with Personal Needs, given that those unhealthy relationships should
increase insiders’ need or desire to commit harmful actions.

3.6 Summary
This chapter presented this research’s Insider Threat Logical Data Mode l and
Insider Threat System Dynamics Mode l, to include the mode ls’ entities, attributes,
relationships, and feedback loops.

This chapter also explained the selection of the

Abstracted Common Model and the additions made to it, resulting in the Insider Threat
Model for Sabotage and Espionage, which is used in the USAF policy review.
Chapter IV presents the methodology used for reviewing the DoD and USAF
policies in terms of the best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff and
the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage. The results of the policy review
are discussed, including which practices and variables were addressed, which were not
covered, and which were in conflict with the policies.

The chapter then presents

recommendations that could help the USAF to address the shortfalls and conflicts. Lastly
the chapter proposes three new best practices that can be used by any organization.
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IV. Policy Review

4.1 Overview
This chapter discusses the methodology used to review the DoD and USAF
policies, both in terms of the best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff
this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabo tage and Espionage. For each best practice
or model variable, this research shows to what degree the policies covered it, to include
actors, tools, and areas of focus, such as specific systems, types of insiders, or activities.
Additionally, there is a discussion of the shortfalls and conflicts identified in the policies.
This chapter presents recommendations aimed to assist the USAF in better mitigating the
insider problem. Lastly the chapter offers three new best practices that can be adopted by
any organization. While this chapter summaries the findings, a more detailed breakdown
is included in Appe ndix A.

4.2 Methodology of the Policy Review
After the completion of this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and
Espionage, the methodology for the review of the DoD and USAF policies needed to be
designed. For this review, a pure naturalistic-qualitative strategy was used, from Patton’s
2002 “Integrated Model of Measurement, Design, and Analysis” (Trochim and Donnelly,
2007). This strategy began with a naturalistic inquiry; in this case, “Based on its written
policies, how well pos tured is the Air Force to mitigate insider threats?” The next step
was to collect qualitative data (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007).

Currently, there are

hundreds of DoD and USAF policies; therefore, this research looked at a sampling that
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relate to information assurance (IA) and security, network operations, personnel security,
and special investigations. The sample size grew during the analysis phase as selected
policies referenced to others which, after being evaluated, were added to the sample.
The sample consists primarily of USAF documents, including Air Force
Instructions (AFI), Manuals (AFMAN), and Policy Directives (AFPD). Three DoD- level
documents were also analyzed as they are fundamental publications, often the foundation
for the policies developed by the individual military branches, to include the USAF.
Additionally, the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information” were reviewed. These guidelines are approved by the President
of the United States and used by all government agencies; the USAF does not have its
own set.
The reviewed documents are listed below, grouped into the following four
categories: IA and security, network operations, personnel security, and special
investigations. For each category, the observables to which they relate are listed and
highlighted in the “Cyber Event/Observable Taxonomy” (repeated in Figure 23 for the
reader’s convenience).
•

IA and Security (highlighted in yellow)
o Observables: physical access, materials transfer to handlers, reconnaissance,
other actions, exfiltration, communication (cyber),

manipulation, counter

detection
o DoD 8500.01E: Information Assurance (IA) (Department of Defense, 2002)
o DoD 8500.02: Information Assurance (IA) Implementation (Department of
Defense, 2003)
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o DoD 8570.01-M: Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program
(Department of Defense, 2005)
o AFI 31-401: Infor mation Security Program Management (Department of the
Air Force, 2005a)
o AFI 33-204: Information Assurance (IA) Awareness Program (Department of
the Air Force, 2004c)
o AFI 33-230: Information Assurance Assessment and Assistance Program
(Department of the Air Force, 2004d)
o AFMAN 33-223: Identification and Authentication (Department of the Air
Force, 2005c)
o AFPD 33-1: Information Resource Management (Department of the Air
Force, 2006c)
o AFPD 33-2: Information Assurance (IA) Program (Department of the Air
Force, 2007)
o AFPD 33-3: Information Management (Department of the Air Force, 2006d)
•

Network Operations (highlighted in green)
o Observables: violations, physical access, reconnaissance, other actions,
entrenchment, exfiltration, communication (cyber), manipulation, counter
detection
o AFI 33-115, Volume 1: Network Operations (Department of the Air Force,
2006a)
o AFI 33-115, Volume 2: Licensing Network Users and Certifying Network
Professionals (Department of the Air Force, 2004a)
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o AFI 33-115, Volume 3: Air Force Network Operations Instructions
(Department of the Air Force, 2004b)
o AFI 33-202, Volume 1: Network and Computer Security (Department of the
Air Force, 2006b)
o AFI 33-207: Computer Security Assistance Program (Department of the Air
Force, 1997)
•

Personnel Security (highlighted in magenta)
o Observables: polygraph results, communications, failure to report (finance,
travel, contacts), counter intelligence, foreign travel, personal conduct, social
activity, other actions
o Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information (Under Secretary for Management, 2006)
o AFI 31-501: Personnel Security Program Management (Department of the Air
Force, 2005b)

•

Special Investigations (highlighted in blue)
o Observables: polygraph results, communications, failure to report (finance,
travel, contacts), counter intelligence, foreign travel, personal conduct, social
activity, other actions
o AFI 71-101, Volume 4: Counterintelligence (Department of the Air Force,
2000)
o AFPD 71-1: Special Investigations (Department of the Air Force, 1999)
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Figure 23. Cyber Event/Observable Taxo nomy (Mills et al., 2009)

The next step was to perform a content analysis on these documents.

The

approach used in this research was a combination of a directed and a summative approach
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The directive nature stems from the fact that it was based on
the research previously conducted by the CMU CERT technical staff members, to include
their Abstracted Common Mode l and published best practices (described in the next
section) (Cappelli et al., 2006). CMU CERT’s technical staff provided the overarching
concepts which gave necessary direction to the ge neral research question, known as a
deductive category application (Mayring, 2000). These works are felt to be trustworthy
as the CMU CERT technical staff has been working on the insider threat problem for
over six years and has published numerous repor ts on the subject. Add itionally, the staff
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is sponsored by and has worked with such groups as the United States Secret Service,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Personnel Security Research
Center, and many civilian organizations. These works were not produced specifically in
regards to or on behalf of the USAF, and it is believed that they not biased towards how
the USAF is doing in its fight against insider attacks.
The content analysis also took a summative approach in terms of examining
specific key words for each best practice and variable within the Insider Threat Model for
Sabotage and Espionage. The analys is, conducted b y hand, began with certain key words
and phrases with additional words and phrases being added as the analysis progressed. A
latent content analysis was conducted as the concern was not simply the word count but
the interpretation of the policies which included these key words and phrases. Some
policy statements included the key words and phrases but were found to have no
relevance to the insider threat problem. Those passages that did relate to this research
were recorded and examined to see what insight they provided on the actors involved in
implementing the policy, tools used by these individuals, and specific areas of interest, to
include particular systems, types of insiders, or activities. For example, section 3.8.1.3.
from AFI 33-202, Volume 1 reads,
Information Protection Operations (IPO) personnel in the NCC will check
for antivirus signature files/datfiles upda tes daily from the AFCERT/DoD
CERT sites. Users will pull down new signature files from the NCCcontrolled site or NCC’s site will replicate (if feasible) new signature files
to the users as soon as received. Accomplish a virus scan immediately
following an update of a signature file” (Department of the Air Force,
2006b).
This passage has the key word “antivirus” which is linked with best practice number 7,
“Actively defend against malicious code” (see next section). After reading this passage,
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it is clear that it does indeed relate to protecting the USAF network from malicious code,
which some malicious insiders use to commit sabotage. IPO personnel are responsible
for executing this po licy item, and they use the AFCERT and DoD CERT websites and
virus scans as tools.

There is a focus on using signature-based tools and ensuring

signature files are updated daily.
Once all of the policies were individually analyzed, a summary was developed
that addressed to what extent each best practice or variable from the model is covered in
the policies, to include shortfalls and conflicts. Additionally, overall recommendations
were generated to address the areas which need improvement.
4.2.1

Best Practices for Mitigating Insider Threat

After conducting years of research on the insider threat problem and formulating
multiple mode ls on the subject, the CMU CERT technical staff has published two
versions of the “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Ins ide r Threats”
(2006). The following list is a compilation of the best practices from the second version
of this report and the recommendations for future research made by the CMU CERT
technical staff in its comparison of insider sabotage and espionage (Band et al., 2006).
As mentioned earlier, each policy document was analyzed to see if it incorporates these
best practices.

For each one, the analysis looked for the following key words and

phrases:
1. Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments.
In order to protect its information resources, an organization must identify
possible threats and vulnerabilities, determining both their likelihood and impact.
The organization must factor in insiders as potential threat-sources.
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The

organization must balance the costs, to include money and employee morale,
against the benefits of enhanced security.

Risk assessments can assist it in

accomplishing this (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
Key words and phrases : controls, countermeasures, critical assets, flaws,
impact, likelihood, mitigate, prioritization, risk analysis, risk assessment, risk
management, risk mitigation, threat, vulnerability
2. Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees.
Management must develop a culture of awareness of insider threats, and
an effective way to do this is through training. Employees must understand the
policies in place, why it is important that they are enforced, and the repercussions
if they are not (Cappelli et al., 2006).
Key words and p hrases : awareness, certification, education, espionage, IA,
insider threat, licensing, objectives, orientation, sabotage, social engineering,
training
3. Enforce separation of duties and least privilege.
If the responsibility for essential functions is distributed amongst many
employees, the power of a single individual is reduced. In this situation, it would
be more difficult for an employee to execute a successful incident of espionage or
sabotage without the assistance of others. The security policy of least privilege is
also important as it gives employees access only to the resources they need to
successfully complete their duties (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
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Key words and phrases : least privilege, need-to-know, privileged access,
role-based access, separation of duty, separation of function, two-person
compliance
4. Implement strict password and account management policies and practices.
This is one of the most basic preventive measures; it is absolutely essential
to ensure authe ntication and non-repudiation.

If insiders are restricted from

certain functions due to the policy of least privilege but can compromise other
employees’ accounts, they can still launch attacks (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
Key words and phrases : account review, accountability, authentication,
backdoors, biometrics, common access card (CAC), identification, login, network
user licensing, non-repudiation, passwords, public key encryption, social
engineering, user account, user privilege
5. Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions. Collect and save data for use in
investigations.
By implementing this measure, an organization may be able to identify
technical precursors which are warning signs of a future attack. If noticed in time
and dealt with appropriately, the organization may be able to prevent a damaging
attack. These logs of employee activity should be maintained in case they are
needed as evidence in an investigation (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
Key words and phrases : audit, bypass, cataloging, consent to monitoring,
file modifications, firewall, log, monitor, network traffic, privilege change, traffic
analys is, unauthor ized transmissions, VPN
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6. Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged users.
These administrators and privileged users hold a lot of power as they are
typically the employees who set or implement the policies, as well as monitor the
network resources. They can be in the best position to access information or
deploy an attack, as well as cover up their tracks (Cappelli et al., 2006).
Key words and phrases : backup operators, privileged access, privileged
user, security manager, system administrators
7. Actively defend against malicious code.
Many sabotage attacks involve the deployment of malicious code such as
logic bo mbs.

Though there is no too l that perfectly detects these, security

measures should be in place to try to do so, such as looking for the signatures of
known viruses (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
Key words and phrases : anomaly, antivirus, baseline, hash function,
malicious code, malicious logic, signature, Trojan horse, viruses, worm
8. Use layered defense against remote attacks.
Many attackers have been more comfortable executing their malicious
actions from a remote location, away from the eyes of co-workers and managers.
Therefore security measures and policies regarding remote access must be sound
and well executed (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
Key words and phrases : demilitarized zones, proxy, remote access, remote
dial- in/dial-out communications, VPN
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9. Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.
Mitigating insider threat requires a team effort.

All members of the

organization should be watchful of unusual behavior of their co-workers, and
there should be procedures in place allowing them to report anything suspicious.
In particular, supervisors need training in this area (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
Key words and phrases : acting out of character, alarming statements,
alcohol, Article 15, bankruptcy, behavior, counseling, courts- martial, criminal
activity, drug, embezzlement, espionage, financial irresponsibility, foreign
intelligence, foreign travel, gambling, IA security event/incide nt, indebtedness,
letters of reprimand, mental health, misuse of government property, network
security event/incident, report, reportable information, sabotage, stress, spy,
suspicious activities, terrorism, theft, treason, unauthorized access, unauthorized
release, unauthorized technology transfer, unfavorable information, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), work performance
10. Deactivate computer access following termination.
The organization should have strict procedures in place to disable all
access paths of employees who have been terminated.

The lack of such

procedures has been detrimental to organizations in the past (Cappe lli et al.,
2006).
Key words and phrases : departure, deleting user accounts/passwords,
disabling user account/password, retire, separation, termination
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11. Implement secure backup and recovery processes.
In the event of a successful attack, an organization may be able to lessen
the negative impact by having backup copies of its information (Cappelli et al.,
2006). Management should examine the procedures for creating and maintaining
backup materials as an insider, such as Timothy Lloyd, may increase the impact
of his attack by reducing the existence of or stealing the backup resources (Melara
et al., 2003).
Key words and phrases : backup, contingency, continuity of operations,
disaster, ghost image, recovery, redunda ncy
12. Analyze current access control policies and practices; identify and evaluate
options to mitigate insider threat risk.
Both physical and electronic access paths must be identified, monitored,
and tightly controlled by management (Band et al., 2006). Malicious insiders
have often used access paths that are unknown to the organization to commit their
attacks.
Key words

and

phrases : access,

Access Control List (ACL),

authentication, backdoor, classification, classified information/media/product,
clearance, control, IA awareness/training, identification, investigation, licensing,
need-to-know, privilege, qualification, remote access, SIPRNET, unauthorized
connection
13. Clearly Document Insider Threat Controls
Organizations should document all insider threat controls, make sure
employees understand these controls, and address violations of such controls
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(Cappe lli et al., 2006). Controls are not enforceable if employees are not made
aware of them (Pipkin, 2000).
Key words and

phrases :

insider threat

control,

insider threat

countermeasures
4.2.2

Variables of the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage

Each document from Section 4.2 was also examined to see if it addresses the
variables from the Insider Threat Mode l for Sabotage and Espionage. Below is the list of
the variables as well as whether they are addressed by one of the CMU CERT technical
staff’s best practices. If they are not, this research specifically analyzed if and how the
USAF policies address them. For each of the following variables, any additional key
words or phrases not mentioned above are listed:
•

Auditing and Monitoring: addressed by best practice number 5, “Log, monitor,
and audit employee online actions.”

•

Discovering Unauthorized Access: addressed by best practice number 12,
“Analyze current access control policies and practices; identify and evaluate
options to mitigate insider threat risk. ”

•

Discovering Harmful Actions: addressed by best practice number 5, “Log,
monitor, and audit employee online actions.”

•

Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions: addressed by the
following best practices:
o Number 5, “Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions.”
o Number 9, “Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.”
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o This research also looks at how USAF policies detect prior concerning
behavior through the use of the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to C lassified Information.”
•

Sanctions
o Sanctions due to employee behavior are addressed by best practice number 9,
“Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.”
o While best practice number 2, “Institute periodic security awareness training
for all employees,” addresses informing employees of the repercussions of
violating security measures, it does not address issuing of sanctions. This
research also looks at whether USAF policies mandate that supervisors or
commande rs issue sanctions to employees for inappropriate technical acts.
o Key words and phrases : access, employee intervention, loss of clearance,
network license, Security Information File (SIF), suspension

•

Enforcing Authorization Level Using Access Control : addressed by best practices
o Number 3,” Enforce separation of duties and least privilege.”
o Number 4, “Implement strict password and account management policies and
practices.”
o Number 6, “Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged
users.”
o Number 8, “Use layered de fense against remote attacks.”
o Number 10, “Deactivate computer access following termination.”
o Number 12, “Analyze current access control policies and practices; identify
and evaluate options to mitigate insider threat risk.”
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•

Insider Access- this variable is strongly related to the previous one, and therefore
is addressed by the same best practices listed on the previous page

•

Organization's Prioritization of Profit
o Not addressed by the best practices
o Key words and p hrases : prioritization, priority, profit

•

Organization's Prioritization of Reputation
o Not addressed by the best practices
o Key words and p hrases : prioritization, priority, reputation

•

Organization's Trust of Insider
o Addressed in part by best practice number 1, “Institute period ic enterprisewide risk assessments.”
o This research also looks for any other determinants of trust
o Key words and p hrases : ability, benevolence, integrity, trust, trustworthiness

•

Organization Perceived Risk : addresses by best practice number 1, “Institute
periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments.”

•

Insider Stress
o Addressed in part by best practice number 9, “Monitor and respond to
suspicious or disruptive behavior.”
o This research also looks for any policies that examination employee stress

•

Stressful Event: similar to “Insider Stress”
o Addressed in part by best practice number 9, “Monitor and respond to
suspicious or disruptive behavior.”
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o This research also looks for any policies that call for the examination of
stressful events in the employee’s life
o Key words and p hrases : stressful event
•

Personal Predispositions
o Not addressed by the best practices
o While predispositions may be difficult for an organization to identify, this
research looks at any policies or procedures that try to glean insight into the
employee’s psychological state, perhaps through talking with friends, family,
and co-workers
o Key words and phrases: Many of the same words as for best practice number
9, “Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.” Yet in this
case, the behavior or activity occurred in the past, usually identified during a
background investigation via the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to C lassified Information.”


Others: addiction, allegiance to the United States, dishonesty, disloyalty,
dual citizenship, egotism, emotional condition, employment/service to
foreign organization, irresponsibility, lack of candor, lack of sound
judgment, malicious, mental condition, physical condition, resistant to
change, sexual behavior, sexual deviance, social skills, unexplained
affluence, unreliability, untrustworthy, violent behavior

•

Negative Relationships with Co-Workers
o Not addressed by the best practices
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o Key words and phrases : association, friendship, relationship, social influence,
social network
•

Positive Relationships with Co-Workers
o Not addressed by the best practices
o Key words and p hrases : same as abo ve

•

Personal Needs: similar to Personal Predispositions
o Not addressed by the best practices
o While needs may be difficult for an organization to identify, this research
looks at any policies or procedures that try to glean insight into this, perhaps
through talking with friends, family, a nd co-workers
o Key words and phrases : ba nkruptcy, business/financial/property interest in
foreign country, disgruntlement, embezzlement, espionage, expectation,
financial

irresponsibility,

foreign

influence,

gambling,

indebtedness,

recognition, revenge, sadistic, satisfaction, treason, unexplained affluence

4.3 Findings for Best Practices and Variables
For each best practice or variable, this research discusses to what de gree the
policies implement it, as well as if there are any aspects that are not covered or any
conflicts between the best practice or variable and the po licies. Table 1 provides an
overarching summary for each as well.
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Table 1. Summary of Findings
Best Practice or Model Variable
“Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk
assessments”

Ove rarching S ummary
- Too much foc us on threats and
vulnerabilities, which is only part of the
assessment process
- Need to evaluate likelihood, impact, and
controls

“Institute periodic security awareness
training for all employees”

- Many requirements for IA training but very
little mention of insider threat
- No reference to training employees on
detecting suspicious behavior

“Enforce separation of duties and least
privilege”

- Widespread mandate for “need-toknow”
- Only a few specific examples of
separation of duties (all technical)
- Strong policies regarding authentication
and ide ntification
- Fake accounts (“back doors”) not
addressed
- Activities are mandated but lack of
guidance on retention and activities for
which to look
- Time-consuming nature leads to it not
being accomplished
- Call for increased monitoring and
visibility of privileged, fairly vague
- No separation of duty requirements
- Discuss signature based tools
- No mention of anomaly-based
- Privileged actions are discouraged
- Appr oval author ity is unclear
Does not include acting out of character,
one-time incidents, poor job
performance
- Policy is general
- Unclear regarding who e nsures this
occurs
No guidance on what needs to be
included (e.g., redundancy, ghost
images)
Further guidance needed regarding fake
accounts, ACLs, system administrators,
remote access
Few explicit references

“Implement strict password and account
management policies and practices”

“Log, monitor, and audit employee online
actions. Collect and save data for use in
investigations”

“Use extra caution with system
administrators and privileged users”
“Actively defend against malicious code”
“Use layered defense against remote
attacks”
“Monitor and respond to suspicious or
disruptive behavior”
“Deactivate computer access following
termination”
“Implement secure backup and recovery
processes”
“Analyze current access control policies
and practices; identify and evaluate options
to mitigate insider threat risk”
“Clearly doc ument insider threat controls”
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“Sanctions” (for inappropriate technical
acts)

- Use SIF, suspension or loss of clearance,
restriction of access
- No mention of employee intervention
Not discussed
Not discussed

“Organization's Prioritization of Profit”
“Organization's Prioritization of
Reputation”
“Organization's Trust of Insider”
“Insider Stress”
“Stressful Event”
“Personal Predispositions”
“Negative Relationships with Co-Workers”

-

“Positive Relationships with Co-Workers”
“Personal Needs”

-

“Detecting Concerning Behavior and
Technical Actions”

4.3.1

-

Addressed in background investigation
Not discussed
Not discussed
Focus on conduct and behavior
Insight into personality not addressed
Discuss associations with persons
committing criminal activity and
sabotage
No discussion of parties involved in
malicious technical activity
Not discussed
Address finances and foreign influence
No discussion of revenge, recognition,
self-confidence
Focus on mishandling of information
No discussion of suspicious behaviors

Best Practice- “Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments”

The policies talk about identifying threats, vulnerabilities, controls, and risks, and
they mandate the execution of risk assessments at all levels from the DoD Chief
Information Officer (CIO) to personnel in the network control centers (NCC) to the
information system security officer (ISSO) responsible for individual information
systems.

The policies also establish a hierarchical structure that suppo rts a strong

communication flow of security information, to include new vulnerabilities and
appropriate countermeasures. Each level receives guidance from higher levels as well as
reports to those levels of any security flaws or suspicious network behavior.
Other actors who play a role in executing this best practice include the following:
Defense Information Systems Network Designated Approving Authority (DISN DAA),
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AF Communications Agency (AFCA), 92d Information Warfare Aggressor Squadron (92
IWAS), AF Network Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC), and IA offices at the
Major Command (MAJCOM), Numbered Air Force (NAF) and base levels. These actors
use many tools to complete the risk assessments to include information from the DoD
CIO Annual IA Report, DoD uniform risk criteria, Information Assurance Vulnerability
Alerts (IAVA) and bulletins (IAVB), and AF Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).
They ide ntify po tential risks through the adjudicative process, independent audits (to
include Scope EDGE and 92 IWAS red teams), self-assessments, and certification and
accreditation (C&A) process. NCCs and ISSOs also utilize Vulnerability Assessment
Too ls, network vulnerability or penetration testing, and IA security incidents and patterns
from network logs and scans. The areas of foc us addressed in the policies were systems
at all levels (DoD, service, and base), interconnected systems, enclaves, wireless
networks, port management, software patches, biometrics, directives and technical orders,
system life-cycle documents, continuity of ope rations plans (CONOPS), and training and
awareness programs.
Though there is much discussion of identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and
controls, there is little or no discussion regarding two vital steps in a risk assessment:
likelihood determination and impact analysis.

AFI 33-115, Volume 1 does require

AFNOSC, NOSCs, and NCCs to measure the impact of incidents that have occurred, but
there is no discussion of these employees estimating the effects of an attack that could
occur (Department of the Air Force, 2006a). AFPD 33-2 was the only policy to mention
that security measures invested into an information system should be “commensurate
with the shared risk and potential harm that could result from disclosure, loss, misuse,
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alteration, or destruction of the information” (Department of the Air Force, 2007). There
are no policies regarding estimating the likelihood of a security incident. Risk cannot
truly be determined without a complete identification of likelihood and impact.
4.3.2

Best Practice- “Institute periodic security awareness training for all
employees”

The policies clearly address the goa ls of the DoD and USAF to ensure all
employees receive both initial and annual refresher IA training. There is also discussion
of providing an increased depth for students who may become involved in planning,
programming, managing, operating, or maintaining information systems. Lead actors
include the DoD CIO, Air Education and Training Command (AETC), United States Air
Force Academy, AFCA, IA offices, unit commanders, unit IA awareness managers, and
the end users (to include military, civilian, guard, reserve, government contractors, and
foreign national employees). These actors use initial military training, Air University
courses, civilian career programs, the “Air Force Information Assurance Awareness
Training”

computer-based

training

(CBT),

the

USAF

IA

Home

Page

(https://private.afca.af.mil/ip), the DoD CIO Annual IA Report, Counterintelligence
Awareness Briefings, pamphlets, posters, screen savers, and videotapes in order to teach
personnel IA concepts, measures, and tactics.
The major areas of focus for these training programs and materials are as follows:
authorized and proper use of information systems and the Internet; account and password
policies; threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures; privacy rights and consent to
monitoring; responsibilities of responding to and reporting suspicious activities and

91

conditions (e.g., social engineering and threats from foreign entities); and duty to protect
information systems.
While the concepts listed above factor into the insider threat problem, there are
few specific references to insider threat. DoD 8570.01-M does require IA training to
include “examples of internal threats such as malicious or incompetent authorized users,
users in the employ of terror ist groups or foreign countries, disgrunt led employees or
Service members, hackers, crackers, and self- inflicted intentional or unintentional
damage” (Department of Defense, 2005). Despite this DoD mandate, only two USAF
policies were found to explicitly address insider threats. AFPD 33-2 calls for awareness
briefings on “insider threat” from AFOSI (Department of the Air Force, 2007), and AFI
33-204 states that one goal of IA awareness if for users to understand countermeasures to
protect against sabotage and espionage (Department of the Air Force, 2004c).

In

addition, DoD 8570.01-M specifically requires teaching users about social engineering
risks, but this is the only document to mention social engineering; no USAF documents
refer to it. Furthermore, there is no discussion regarding malicious insiders employing
social engineering tactics which the CMU CERT technical staff discusses in its
“Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Inside r Threats” (Cappe lli et al.,
2006).
Another shortfall is the quality of training. DoD 8570.01-M calls for IA training
to be
…current, engaging, and relevant to the target audience to enhance its
effectiveness. Its primary purpose is to influence behavior. The focus
must be on actions that empower the user to mitigate threats and
vulnerabilities to DoD systems. Authorized users must understand that
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they are a critical link in their organization’s overall IA pos ture
(Department of Defense, 2005).
The USAF’s main method for training is the IA CBT, but research has shown that
training which involves face-to-face interaction is more successful, both in terms of
effectiveness and satisfaction (Heinze, 2004). While a study by Piccoli et al. (2001) did
not find a decrease in training effectiveness within a virtual environment, the study’s
participants did feel a significant shift of responsibility from the instructor to themselves
and had problems adjusting to the learning environment. DoD 8570.01-M recognizes
that the user is essential in achieving a secure environment but may not be effectively
sending this message through the current training program (Department of Defense,
2005). To mitigate insider threat it is indeed essential to gain the help of all employees,
but the policies are not emphasizing the requirement to teach them about insider threat.
Users are given the responsibility to report suspicious behaviors, but the y are not
provided with examples of malicious insider behavior might look like. Additionally,
some of the methods mentioned are not widely known abo ut or used, to include the
USAF IA Home Page and AFOSI briefings.
4.3.3

Best Practice- “Enforce separation of duties and least privilege”

The DoD and USAF offer strict guidelines about limiting information access.
Holding a security clearance does not entitle an individual to all information at that level
of classification; there also must be a valid work-related reason, or need-to-know. The
policies do focus on the security and protection of classified information, as well as
military intelligence, proprietary information, and web sites containing official
information. There is also much oversight of access to privileged programs, utilities,
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and files, such as system parameter and configuration files, databases, assemblers,
debuggers, password files, and activity logs. Special attention is paid to the access
granted to joint and coalition partners and those only working within a unit for a short
amount of time. The main actors in implementing these policies include the AFNOSC,
NOSCs, Top Secret Control Offices, IA personnel, system administrators, and all
authorized users.
While there were a few areas that require separation of duties or two-person
compliance (Time Compliance Network Orders [TCNO], Top Secret Control Accounts,
and IA functions) they were all specifically related to information or information
systems. Besides TCNOs, there are no policies regarding NOSC and NCC functions
establishing separation of duties. It can be dangerous not to have checks and balances in
place within the administration of the network and its vital systems.

Additionally,

managerial, administrative, and personnel responsibilities should also be compliant with
these security policies. If one employee has too much power and is not being monitored,
s/he may be able to cause harm and not even be detected.
4.3.4

Best Practice- “Implement strict password and account management
policies and practices”

The policies regarding password and account management cover two of the most
important issues, accountability and non-repudiation. In order to identify and possibly
prosecute a malicious insider, an organization needs to be able to prove that the insider
was indeed the executor of the attack. Non-repudiation means that someone cannot deny
or refute an action they have performed. The CAC has been implemented throughout the
DoD as a method to provide improved network security and non-repudiation via digital
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signatures. If an individual commits an attack using his network account while using a
CAC and personal identification number (PIN), then it is much more difficult for that
person to deny the event. While it is still possible that someone could have stolen the
person’s CAC and compromised the PIN, it is generally accepted that the CAC/PIN
combination provides a much higher level of security than a simple username/password
combination.
DoD and USAF policies also implement strong identification and authentication
procedures to include strict passwords requirements (when the CAC is not feasible) and
biometrics.

They also require network security personnel to monitor accounts and

actively search for vulnerabilities such as weak passwords.

The policies cover such

topics as assigning, suspending, and deleting user IDs, passwords, and privileges;
resetting passwords; updating e- mail addresses; one-time passwords; dormant accounts;
rapid log-on retries; reusable generic or group usernames; remote sessions; and trusted
profiles (e.g., system administrator, security officer, root user, super user, and backup
operators).

Key players in implementing these policies are NOSCs, NCCs, system

administrators, unit security manager, client suppor t administrators, and all users. These
personnel use too ls such as favorable background investigation, the Personnel Security
Management Program, proper security clearances, password cracking tools and
enforcement software, IA training, and internal and external assessments.
One of the major shor tfalls in the DoD and USAF po licy is that there is no
explicit check for the fake accounts (or “back doors”), which malicious insiders often
create to conduct their activities.

There are policies regarding granting accounts (to

include the requirements for a valid security clearance, background check, and IA
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training), checking for dormant accounts, and terminating accounts, but in no document
reviewed for this research was there a requirement for a comparison of current users and
active accounts.
As strong as network policies are in the DoD and USAF, most research shows
that the greatest security shortfall is people.

Humans are susceptible to being lazy,

complacent, forgetful, deceived, or malicious, which can all result in a security incident.
For example, if while gone from their office, personnel leave their CACs in the ir
computer and their pins or passwords written on a piece of paper in their desks, malicious
insiders can access their accounts. Employees may also give out their passwords to coworkers before leaving for vacation or to a stealthy social engineer. The policies are only
as good as the users required to follow and enforce them. Users must understand the vital
role they play in information secur ity.
4.3.5

Best Practice- “Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions.
Collect and save data for use in investigations”

The reviewed policies cover the monitoring of activities such as logging into and
modifying information on individual systems and the network. Special attention is paid
to suspicious activities such as changes to access controls, privileges, and passwords;
unauthor ized transmissions or attempts to bypass security measures; unauthorized
installation of mode ms; attempts to access activity logs; uns uccessful log-in attempts; and
attempted or realized penetrations.

The policies also focus on protecting the core

network services and devices, as well as VPN tunnels; this is important as many insiders
launch attacks through VPN connections. Network professionals are required to use
these logs to identify weak configurations and security deficiencies. Also all users are to
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be informed that their activities on government systems are being monitored. Lastly, it is
stressed to associate any network incident with the responsible party, to enforce
accountability and non-repudiation.
Important actors identified in these policies are system administrators, ISSOs, and
computer network defense (CND) personnel.

These parties use the following tools:

firewalls; log files pertaining to errors, network traffic, and intrusions; and, when
possible, automated responses of information systems to abort or suspe nd unauthorized
user activity.
Though all network users are reminded of their consent to monitoring via pop-up
messages on their computer screens and in their IA training, there is not much attention
paid to what types of activities are monitored. There are also many other work-related
activities that could be monitored, such as changes in arrival and departure times, printing
or transmitting more files, or accessing files not needed for work.

While there is

guidance requiring auditing, there is not much description regarding which specific
activities to look and how long to retain the log files. Between August 2005 and July
2006, the DoD Inspe ctor General (IG) found information assurance weaknesses due to
audit trails during 6 out of 16 of their audits. One finding was that standard procedures
were not in place and reviews occurred informally, relying on “infinite permanency in
personnel positions and consistent memory” (Department of Defense Office of Inspector
General, 2006b). Another issue is that there is not always sufficient time, personnel, and
technology to audit logs effectively. Another audit conducted b y the DoD IG found that
often the auditing o f log files did not occur because to do so was “cumbersome and timeconsuming” (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2006b).
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4.3.6

Best Practice- “Use extra caution with system administrators and
privileged users”

The DoD and USAF policies clearly outline the level of investigation needed for
personnel in security management and administration jobs, paying particular attention to
contractors and foreign nationals. Additionally, AFI 33-202, Volume 1 and AFMAN 33223 both mandate that system administrators will not have “personal accounts with
domain administrative privileges” (Department of the Air Force, 2006b; Department of
the Air Force, 2005c). The policies also focus on increased monitoring of users with
access to Automated Information Systems and ensuring that security professionals only
use i- TRM password cracking tools on the systems for which they have responsibility.
Key actors are IA personnel, specifically managers, as well as the commanders
and supervisors in charge of assigning personnel to these privileged positions.

In

addition to background, local agency, and credit check investigations, these employees
use CACs, hardware tokens, training and certification requirements, and Privileged
Access Agreements to maintain visibility over these vital roles.
As mentioned earlier, policies do require separation of duty among IA functions
but do not state the same for other important security functions like system
administration. In add ition, the language used in these policies is not very c lear. AFI 33202, Volume 1 calls for the wing IA office to maintain “visibility over all privileged user
assignments” (Department of the Air Force, 2006b), and AFI 31-501 calls for
“commanders and or supervisors [to] have ensured increased monitoring of the individual
having AIS access” (Department of the Air Force, 2005b). Both of these statements do
not provide much guidance on the level of monitoring and visibility that is appropriate.
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4.3.7

Best Practice- “Actively defend against malicious code”

The policies reviewed for this research discussed many tactics for fighting against
malicious viruses which may enter the network from various sources, to inc lude software,
e-mail, and websites.

Vital actors include AFCA, AFNOSC, NOSCs, NCCs, IPO

personnel, CND personnel, DAA, ISSO, CSA, and authorized users. The antivirus too ls
used by these employees are signature-based meaning that they look for known viruses.
IPO personnel are required to check daily for new signature files from DoD and USAF
Computer Emergency Response Team websites.
Other areas of focus include wireless networks, freeware, firmware, shareware,
public domain software, and removable and fixed media. In addition to antivirus tools,
these security personnel fight malicious code with software patches, security fixes,
configuration management, malicious logic reports, and user awareness training. One
theme within these policies is to protect the systems by limiting the modifications that a
typical network user can make to an infor mation system, thereby elimina ting the chance
of them introducing malicious code to the organization. Similar to the results described
earlier, the hierarchical structure of the DoD and USAF is utilized to assist in the defense
of malicious code, especially in regards to the latest information flowing down to the
NCCs.
While signature-based tools can be very effective at detecting known attacks, they
cannot detect modified or new attacks. It is advisable to have anomaly-based tools which
detect abnormal events, traffic, or configurations (Grimaila, 2008).
discussed in the reviewed policies.
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These were not

4.3.8

Best Practice- “Use layered defense against remote attacks”

The policies mandate the use of proxy services and demilitarized zones to protect
the information resources while allowing remote access for telework. In addition, the
execution of privileged actions during a remote session is highly discouraged. IAMs and
IAOs are required to maintain and review access and activity logs of all remote sessions,
paying close attention to any privileged actions, if they are allowed. The policies also
prohibit the call- forwarding capability on modems and call for the disconnection of
sessions after 15 minutes of inactivity. The NOSCs and NCCs play the prominent roles
in executing and enforcing these policies, and they use such tools as VPN client software,
access tables, and screened subnets.
There is no discussion in the po licy regarding who the app roval authority is for
allowing remote access and deciding what functions may be executed remotely.
Additionally, there is no explicit policy regarding the termination of remote access; they
may be handled like all other network accounts. Organizations need to handle remote
access very carefully as malicious insiders often feel more comfortable doing harm from
outside the office where they are not physically being monitored (Cappelli et al., 2006).
4.3.9

Best Practice- “Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive
behavior”

The policies focus on the following types of behaviors: criminal activities,
technical incidents, financial problems, and family issues.

Examples of concerning

behavior are indebtedness, child or spouse abuse, action threatening network security,
request for unauthorized access to controlled information, unauthorized technology
transfer, and contact with a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer or foreign
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diplomatic establishment. AFPD 71-1 mandates the AFOSI to conduct counterespionage
operations (Department of the Air Force , 1999). The other major actors are the Central
Adjudication Facility (CAF), commanders, security officials, NCCs, and IAOs, and they
use security information files, investigation reports, and mental health evaluations. In
addition, all users are required to report any of these types of behavior that they
personally witness.
Some suspicious behaviors identified in insider threat research were not discussed
in the policies, to include employees acting out of character or making alarming
statements (Puleo, 2006). Additionally, AFI 31-501 states that poor duty performance or
a one-time incident related to alcohol or poor judgment should not warrant the creation of
an SIF, which is used when determining if employees should retain their security
clearance (Department of the Air Force, 2005b). This is not consistent with the guidance
from the CMU CERT technical staff.
4.3.10 Best Practice- “Deactivate computer access following termination”
The USAF policies call for the disablement and deletion of user accounts of
employees leaving the organization. The NOSCs, NCCs, system administrators, and
CSAs work together to make this happen. AFMAN 33-223 states, “Ensure procedures
are in place so the Network Control Center, workgroup manager, and system
administrator are notified when an employee (military, civilian, or contractor) transfers,
retires, separates, or is terminated” (Department of the Air Force, 2005c). The language
of this is a bit weak as it does not explicitly assign the responsibility of notifying these
entities. In DoDI 8500.2 the responsibility of notifying IA personnel when access to an
information system is no longer needed is assigned to “authorized users” (Department of
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Defense, 2003). If the responsibility is solely in the hands of the employees, they may
not follow this in order to keep their accounts.
4.3.11 Best Practice- “Implement secure backup and recovery processes”
Per the policies, AFNOSC, NOSCs, and NCCs all must have backup, continuity
of operation, and recovery plans in place. Add itionally, AFNOSC is required to assist
NOSCs and NCCs with their plans. The policies mandate network personnel to backup
servers daily and test recovery procedures quarterly. What these plans should include is
not spe lt out in the po licies. For exa mple, there is no discussion of whether redunda nt
servers should be in place or whether ghost images should be maintained.
4.3.12 Best Practice- “Analyze current access control policies and practices;
identify and evaluate options to mitigate insider threat risk”
The DoD and USAF policies discuss the major topics surrounding access control,
to include identification and authentication. Access is further contingent on security
clearances and need-to-know for the mission at hand. Additional restrictions for special
users, such as foreign nationals, contractors, and volunteers, are identified as well.
Particular attention is paid to privileged users, classified or controlled information,
SIPRNET systems, remote access, shared files, firewalls, and intrusion prevention
systems. The USAF Information Warfare Center and NCCs are required to report all
backdoors and unauthorized connections to the NOSCs.

Other topics covered are

building and area entry controls, granting o f interim access, and deletion of access.
AFNOSC, unit commanders, ISSOs, and IAOs also play roles in granting and
controlling access to information and information systems. They use such tools as user
licensing, position requirements and qualifications, IA awareness and training, network
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compo nents us ing media access control, Access Control Lists (ACL), and system security
author ization agreements.
Many successful insider attacks have included the creation of dummy accounts
and back doors; therefore, access control is of utmost importance (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
While the reviewed policies do d iscuss managing ACLs, the only specific regulations are
for CND systems, such as firewalls and intrusion prevention systems, and service
de livery po int routers. Also, as mentioned previously, the procedures for notifying the
network personnel that an employee’s access should be removed are fairly vague and
leave the responsibility to “authorized users.”
4.3.13 Best Practice- “Clearly document insider threat controls”
While these results show that the DoD and USAF have controls in place to
mitigate insider threat, they are rarely stated as such. The only explicit references are in
regards to training employees on insider threat and reporting suspicious behavior related
to espionage or sabotage.
4.3.14 Variable- “Sanctions” (for inappropriate technical acts)
In terms of issuing sanctions, the po licies foc us on the suspe nsion or loss of a
security clearance and restricted access to controlled areas or information. The CAF,
DAA, commanders, and CSAs are all invo lved and primarily use information within the
SIF and regarding violations of the licensing principles to make their decisions. These
principles are spelt out in AFI 33-115, Volume 2 and include “failure to maintain an
acceptable level of proficiency on a critical program; actions that threaten the security of
a network or a governmental communications system; [and] actions that may result in
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damage or harm to a network or governmental communications system” (Department of
the Air Force, 2004a).
As discussed earlier, sanctions can have varying effects.

While for some

employees it increases their risk adversity and therefore decreases their motivation to
cause further incidents, for others it increases both their disgruntlement and motivation to
cause an attack.

The CMU CERT technical staff recommends using employee

intervention to help reduce the disgruntlement (Cappe lli et al., 2007). This organizational
control is not discussed in the DoD and USAF policies.
4.3.15 Variable- “Organization's Prioritization of Profit”
Given that the USAF is a government agency, it is not in the business of
generating profits, which would naturally lead to the conclusion that it would be willing
to invest significantly in security controls. One caveat is that the USAF’s funding is
approved by Congress and therefore it does not have complete control over how its
budget is spent.
4.3.16 Variable- “Organization's Prioritization of Reputation”
Given that the USAF is in the business of national secur ity, it is inherently
concerned with its reputation, in the eyes of the citizens of the United States, of its allied
nations, and of its adversarial nations. It would make sense to conclude that the USAF
would want to invest extensively in security controls. Similar to the section above, the
USAF is limited by its Congressional budget.
4.3.17 Variable- “Organization's Trust of Insider”
The DoD and USAF policies discuss the fact that complete confidence cannot be
achieved, so a risk management approach is used to determine access to critical
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information and systems. The “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for
Access to Classified Information” are important tools for those in charge of granting
access. There guidelines cover all three of the aspects of trust outlined in this research,
ability, integrity, and benevolence.

In terms of ability, the guidelines look at the

individuals’ ps ychological conditions, possible addictions, and any past incidents where
they proved their failure to protect controlled information or correctly use information
systems.

The guidelines relevant to benevolence are concerned about employees’

allegiance to the United States, as well as their foreign influence, preference, or activities.
In terms of integr ity, the guidelines look at the individuals’ criminal record, financial
activity, and history of use and handling of information and information systems.
4.3.18 Variable- “Insider Stress”
The stress level of insiders can play into their disgruntlement and desire to
satisfy their personal needs, perhaps at the detriment of their or ganization (Band et al.,
2006). Supervisors and co-workers should look for displays of stress and intervene to
prevent the problem from escalating. The DoD and USAF policies do not discuss this
aspect of the insider threat problem.
4.3.19 Variable- “Stressful Event”
The occurrence of a stressful event historically has been a trigger for malicious
insider attacks (Band et al., 2006). Similar to the section above, supervisors should be
monitoring for such events, whether they are events that affect the entire organization
(like a reduction- in-force) or just one employee (like a divorce).
policies do not discuss this aspect of the insider threat problem.
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The DoD and USAF

4.3.20 Variable- “Personal Predispositions”
By conducting background investigations, the DoD and USAF examine an
employee’s predispositions quite thoroughly, covering areas such as criminal activity,
mental health, allegiance to the United States, addictions, sexual behavior, inappropriate
handling of information and information systems, and financial responsibility.

The

investigation also entails obtaining a historical picture of the individual’s personal
conduct, by talking with employers, co-workers, and family and friends.

Areas of

interest are disloyalty, dishonesty, unreliability, untrustwor thiness, lack of sound
judgment, irresponsibility, lack of candor, disruptive or violent behavior, and
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations.
One aspect that is not covered in the policies is trying to obtain insight into an
individual’s personality, to inc lude whether the person is malicious, egotistical, resistant
to c hange, and lacking in social skills.
4.3.21 Variable- “Negative Relationships with Co-Workers”
The po licies foc us on relationships an employee has with individuals who have
exhibited a weak allegiance to the United States and committed espionage, treason,
terrorism, or sedition. Per the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for
Access to Classified Information,” background investigators also look for an employee’s
association with persons who have a history of criminal activity or sabotage.

The

policies do not discuss identifying a n employee’s relationships with co-workers who have
committed technical or behavioral pr ecursory events at work.
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4.3.22 Variable- “Positive Relationships with Co-Workers”
Though the DoD and USAF policies did discuss searching for unhealthy
relationships, they do not mention researching those which an individual has with
favorable co-workers. While the USAF promotes teamwork, the frequency of relocation
for active duty employees could affect how socially tied to the organization they are.
4.3.23 Variable- “Personal Needs”
In terms of personal needs the policies cover those related to finances and foreign
influences. Per the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information,” background investigators look for evidence of unexplained
affluence, embezzlement, frivolous spending, gambling problems, or inability to live
within one’s means or repay debts.

The investigators also search for “substantial

business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country” (Under Secretary for
Management, 2006). The policies do not discuss gaining insight into the individuals’
need for revenge, for recognition, to prove their talents, or to boost their self-confidence.
Additionally, the policies do not instruct investigators to uncover evidence of a sadistic
nature.
4.3.24 Variable- “Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions”
As mentioned earlier, there are policies in place to monitor suspicious behavior in
the workplace in terms of technical incidents, to include actions threatening network
security, requests for unauthorized access to controlled information, and unauthorized
technology transfers. In accordance with the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information,” background investigators also look for
past incidents of mishandling protected information or information systems. Examples of
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concerning behavior include the following: copying or disclosure of controlled
information, storing controlled information in an unauthor ized location, noncompliance
with procedures or regulations, unauthorized modification or destruction of information
systems, a nd unauthorized introd uction of hardware or software.
As mentioned previously, the policies do not include guidance and requirements
for detecting behavior precursors such as decrease in job performance or making
alarming s tatements.

4.4 Recommendations for Better Mitigating Insider Threat
This next section presents recommendations for nine areas which were identified
in this research as needing additional measures in order to better protect the USAF from
insider attacks.
4.4.1

Risk Management and Backup Plans

While risk management is covered significantly in the DoD and USAF policies,
the focus is on identifying threats and vulnerabilities. Additionally, the USAF must
determine the risk of a threat-source exercising or triggering a vulnerability. The risk is
comprised of both the likelihood and impact of this occurring. Organizations must also
assess the ability of current controls to mitigate this risk.

Determining the risk is

important as it guides investments in security controls and the creation of security
policies (Stoneburner et al., 2002). Organizations often prioritize high-risk assets as they
are more likely to be compromised or the impact would be significant if they were.
The prioritization of assets is an important element in creating sound backup and
recovery plans as well. To achieve continuity of ope rations in the event of an attack,
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redundancy should be built into the network, especially for high-risk assets. If the attack
completely destroys resources, those that are high- impact are often those that an
organization wants to replace and put back on line first. The DoD and USAF policies
briefly discuss the need for backup and recovery plans, but it is advisable for greater
emphasis and detail to be provided, to include the incorporation of risk management.
A key element to the success of an enterprise risk assessment is the invo lvement
of leadership, not simply network professionals. The leaders are best qualified to assess
factors such as impact to mission. The leaders also need to be in charge of determining
and balancing the organizational priorities. Though the USAF is not a profit-oriented
business, it does have to be a responsible steward of it Congressional budget. Since the
USAF is highly concerned about its reputation, the prioritization of investments is even
more challenging; the USAF must aim for strong security on a tight budget.
4.4.2

Limit Power of a Single Employee

Historically, many successful attacks have resulted from one individual, such as a
system administrator, possessing too much power on the network. It is vital to have
checks and ba lances with the or ganization to p revent this. One such method is to require
two-person compliance for privileged activities. While the DoD and USAF policies
require this for a select few activities, it is advisable to require it for more. One such
activity that would be a prime candidate for two-person compliance is the production of
data back-ups.

An or ganization can have sound recovery plans, but if a malicious

network professional is purposefully not creating, destroying, or stealing the back-ups,
the plans will be of little use. The fact that Timothy Lloyd stole the back- up tapes from
the Omega Engineering Corporation greatly increased the damages to the company
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(Melara et al., 2003). Another activity for which it is advisable to have two-person
compliance is the creation of new user accounts. Many successful insider attacks have
included insiders creating bogus accounts in order to commit the malicious acts
(Cappe lli et al., 2006).
As mentioned earlier, these policies of separation of duties and least privilege
should be applied to more than just activities related to information systems.

An

organization’s security can benefit from these being embraced for managerial,
administrative, and personnel functions as well.
4.4.3

Account Management

As mentioned in the previous section, account management is a vital aspect of the
mitigation of insider threat.

In addition to closely monitoring the creation of new

accounts, network professionals should frequently check for bogus accounts. This should
be done randomly; if it is done on a certain day every month, a malicious user could
delete the phony account before it would be detected (Cappe lli et al., 2006). ACLs
should be monitored consistently and randomly as well.

Finally, while the policies

require special attention for SA and other privileged accounts, the specifics of this should
be outlined, to include the frequency of and what is included in checks. Examples of
activities that should be monitored are as follows: creating user accounts, modifying
systems or policies, running scripts, and modifying logs (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
The accurate deletion of accounts, privileges, and access is also essent ial in
mitigating insider attacks. The DoD and USAF policies mention that procedures should
be in place to ensure deletion occurs, and most likely the specific measures are spelt out
at a lower level of documentation. In terms of these measures, it is recommended that the
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user whose access is being deleted is not the one respo nsible for notifying the network
professionals. It would be better to have the supervisor notify the appropriate network
personnel.

The extended use of the CACs should be helpful as well, as long as

procedures are in place for the revocation of them upon termination.
Since malicious insiders have been found to be more comfortable executing
inappropriate behavior from remote accounts, such accounts need to be highly monitored
(Cappe lli et al., 2006). The policies should explicitly state who grants permission for
remote access, such as a unit commander. Additionally, while the policies discourage the
ability for remote users to execute privileged actions, a more strict and explicit policy
may be more effective. It would be best to clearly spell out which functions are of
special concern and who would decide whether these could be executed remotely.
4.4.4

Monitoring Online Actions

While the policies clearly require the collection and auditing of activity logs, there
should also be specifics regarding for which activities to look, how often logs are
reviewed, and how long they should be maintained. Additionally storage space and
bandwidth are serious concern for the USAF.

Logs can ob viously not be kept

indefinitely, and the amount of data collected can overwhelm some networks, especially
those which are deployed. Research should continue in the area of automated auditing
tools, such as the work being done by MITRE (Lee, 2007).
4.4.5

Creating Baselines

Per the reviewed policies, the USAF primarily identifies malicious code through
the use of signature-based tools which look for known dangerous code. The USAF could
benefit from using anomaly-based tools which look for changes to vital files. Many
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attacks target such files as “Windo ws Explor er” and “Task Manager” to cause damage
and hide their own presence and activity (Grimaila, 2008). If the USAF was to create and
maintain baselines of these files and routinely compare them to the files’ current state,
then alterations could be detected.
The USAF could also create baselines of typical user behavior on the network. If
users began to act abnormally, such as look ing at files they do not usua lly access or
working odd hours, this could trigger the network professionals to look more closely at
these users’ activities. Unfortunately, creating and maintaining baselines for all network
users would be quite time-consuming and expe nsive. Given the USAF’s current budget,
it might be wise to focus on privileged users such as system administrators.

While

anomaly-based tools can detect unusual network activity and attacks that do not have
signatures, they can also trigger many false positives (Grimaila, 2008). This could lead
to network security professionals wasting their time investigating innocuous activity and
morale decreasing if employees feel the USAF has little trust in them and is suspicious of
anything they do out of the ordinary.
4.4.6

Training and Awareness

Training and awareness regarding insider threat is one of the most important
tactics the USAF could adopt. All employees should understand the significance of the
threat and what the pos sible da mages are. They should understand what variables and
specific behaviors are common among malicious insiders so that they may be better
prepared to identify and report them. In the cases of both Robert Hanssen and Timothy
Lloyd, there were many behavioral warning signs, but co-workers were either uneducated
or reporting procedures were not in place. All USAF employees must unde rstand that
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they all play a role in the mitigation of insider threat; deterrence and detection is
depende nt on everyone working together. Often a co-worker dismisses suspicious
behavior of a fellow employee because it is a one-time occurrence, and s/he does not
want to get the individual into trouble.

What the co-worker may not know is that

suspicious behavior has also been witnessed by others. The conglo meration of all the
incidents is what could signal to an organization that it needs to intervene before an
attack occurs.
While the DoD and USAF policies include many insider threat countermeasures,
the typical network user may not be aware of them. Given the amount of information
available today, it would not be surprising if employees do not read every security policy.
Similar to the discussion of auditing log files, some work-related activities are very timeconsuming, and subsequently there may not be time for all of them to be accomplished.
Insider threat training and awareness should ensure that employees are indeed educated
about them (Cappe lli et al., 2006). The success of some of these controls relies on the
employees’ correct implementation of them. For example, the USAF requires CACs for
logging onto most information systems. If users are sharing their pins or not locking their
work s tations when they are away from their desks, this secur ity measure is not effective.
While hope fully most employees know not to give their passwords or access to their
accounts to outsiders, they must understand the importance of maintaining the same
diligence with their co-workers as well. Additionally, potential malicious parties may be
less inclined to try to forge an attack if they are aware of all the security measures in
place, such as monitoring o f online activity (Cappe lli et al., 2006).
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Training programs should also focus on the tactics that malicious insiders may use
against their co-workers.

When being made aware of social engineering, USAF

employees should be instructed that many malicious insiders use this method to gain
necessary information for their attack. Employees cannot only monitor the behavior of
those outside the organization; they must be wary of co-workers who are asking for
information they do not need or are not authorized to access.
Currently the USAF conducts the majority of its IA training via computer-based
training during which an individual user reads text and then answers questions. To
improve the benefit and enjoyment of training, it is recommended that the USAF look
into more interactive training methods. These could include scenario-based online games
or discussion-based workshops. The CMU CERT technical staff has developed case
studies for or ganization to use in training situations which can help employees practice
what they are being taught (Moore et al., 2008). Currently, due their sensitive nature red
team outbriefs are only presented to top leadership. It is recommended that as much
information as possible is also given to the general pop ulace so that they can learn from
their own mistakes.
4.4.7

Gaining Insight into Personality of the Insider

While the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information” look into an individual’s past behaviors, it would also be wise for
the investigators to develop a personality profile on the person by talking with their
family, friends, co-workers, and supervisors. Characteristics of interest would include
the following: resistance to change (Cappelli et al., 2007), maliciousness, egotism,
sadism, dishonesty, risk-taking, instability, and lack of strength of character, self-control,
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or social skills (Tuglular, 2000). The investigators should also look into past instances
where the individuals exhibited a strong and unhealthy need for revenge, for recognition,
to prove their talents, or to boost their self-confidence (Casey, 2004). Supervisor and coworkers can also help to gaining this insight as they work most closely with the
individual.
4.4.8

Role of the Supervisor

A mitigation strategy that the USAF should emphasize and state in policy is the
development of a strong working relationship between supervisors and their supervisees.
Professionally, supervisors should understand what goals and expectations the ir
supervisees have; as mentioned earlier unmet expectations can lead to disgruntlement
(Cappe lli et al., 2007). This could be accomplished during the routine evaluations that
the USAF currently requires. Ideally, supervisees would feel comfortable expressing
concerns with their supervisors instead of planning sabotage.

On the personal side,

supervisors should check in with the ir supervisees to see if there are any stressful events
going o n in their lives. O ften stress from outside the workplace filters in and affect one’s
job performance. It is especially important for supervisors to talk with supervisees if they
are acting out of character or if the supervisors have learned about the occurrence of
stressful events. Supervisors should also be on the lookout for any relationships the ir
supervisees have with co-workers who could have a negative influence on them. While
intervention can be challenging, it is best to act early and hopefully prevent the problem
from escalating.

If employees are not comfortable talking with supervisors, the

supervisors can recommend other resources, such as mental health professionals or the
chaplains.
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As stated earlier, one-time incidents related to alcohol or poor judgment are not
included in SIFs. This is concerning due to how frequently USAF personnel change jobs
and supe rvisors. An employee could habitually be involved in this type of behavior, but
if each occurrence is detected by a new supervisor, then it is never recorded. Information
regarding poor duty performance is also not kept in SIFs. Though this can be due to lack
of ability or training, it can also be due to employees no longer caring about their jobs. It
can be the first sign that they are disgruntled and planning to harm the organization
(Puleo, 2006).

These behaviors are important for supervisors to take notice of and

monitor.
Supervisors, security clearance investigators, and network professionals all play a
role in collecting information related to the insider threat problem, but the information is
not always shared or fused. In the absence of such a system or process, the supervisor
can be an important integrator of detectable behaviors. The supervisor can also assist in
gaining insight into the insider’s personality as the supervisor interacts with the
individual mor e than mos t others in the organization. The supervisor is essentially the
first line of defense in mitigating this problem.
4.4.9

Documenting Insider Threat Controls

While the DoD and USAF policies discuss many controls which are in place to
help mitigate the insider threat problem, there are very few explicit references to “insider
threat,” “espionage,” or “sabotage.” To show its efforts in protecting against such
attacks, the USAF may want to indicate these clearly in more of its policies. The USAF
could also publish a separate policy or publication centered on insider threat as it does for
counterintelligence (Department of the Air Force , 2000).
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4.5 Additional Best Practices for All Organizations
In addition to the recommendations specifically for the USAF, this research
purposes three new best practices that supplement those published by the CMU CERT
technical staff and similarly can be adopted by any organization. These were developed
after comparing the current best practices to published variables and models, historical
case studies, the DoD and AF policies that were reviewed, and the models developed for
this research, especially the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.
4.5.1

Screen for prior concerning behavior and technical actions, as well as
personal dispositions

The best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff address
monitoring for both concerning behavior and technical actions, but only once the insider
is a part of the organization.

There is no discussion about trying to identify prior

inappropriate behaviors or incidents.

There is also no recommendation for gaining

insight into the insider’s personality (such as maliciousness, egotism, and resistance to
change) and needs (e.g., for revenge, for recognition, to prove their talents, or to boost
their self-confidence) (Tuglular, 2000; Casey, 2004). While this may be difficult to
accomplish, it is advisable to attempt to do so during the interview or background
investigation process.
United States government agencies, to include the military, use the “Adjudicative
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information” during their
background investigations. These guidelines require the investigation to cover such areas
as past criminal activity, allegiance to the United States, addictions, sexual behavior,
financial responsibility, and inappropriate handling of information and information
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systems.

The investigator also acquires a picture of the individual’s past personal

conduct,

to

include

incidents

related

to

disloyalty,

dishonesty,

unreliability,

untrustworthiness, lack of sound judgment, irresponsibility, lack of candor, disruptive or
violent behavior, and unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations.
This best practice relates to the following variables in the Insider Threat Mode l
for Sabotage and Espiona ge: Personal Dispositions, Personal Needs, and Detecting
Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions. These are highlights in green in the Insider
Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage, repeated in Figure 24 for convenience.
4.5.2

Issue sanctions to employees for inappropriate technical acts

The best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff recommend
issuing sanctions for inappropriate employee behavior. While the best practices discuss
infor ming employees of the repe rcussions of violating security measures, they do not
address the issuing of sanctions for such violations. Responding to inappropriate or
unauthorized technical acts is an important measure in preventing additional and possibly
worse incidents from occurring. If malicious insiders are detected and disciplined, they
may become less motivated to attack a second time as their risk adversity is increased
(Band et al., 2006). Even if the act is fairly innocuous or appears accidental, employee
intervention should occur.

The seemingly benign incident could be caused by a

malicious insider who is testing the strength of the security controls (Stanton et al., 2005).
Additionally, even an accidental incident can cause damage.

Documentation should

supplement the sanctions to aid the detection of a pattern, should it develop. Users of an
organization’s network should be held accountable for acts they commit that degrade its
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Figure 24. Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage

security and safety. It is important to note that disgruntled insiders may become even
more upset if issued sanctions. Intervention, perhaps by the supervisor, may be beneficial
to supplement the discipline.
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The USAF does discipline its employees for acts that harm or risk the security of
the network and information systems. Sanctions include restricted access to controlled
areas and information and s uspe nsion or loss of a security clearance.
This best practice relates to several of the variables in the Insider Threat Model
for Sabotage and Espionage, to include Sanctions, Sanctioning Relative to Insider
Actions, Insider’s Perceived Risk, Behavioral & Technical Indicators or Violations
(Actual), Insider Stress (in terms of disgruntlement), and Personal Needs (in terms of
motivation). These are highlights in magenta in the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage
and Espionage (Figure 24).
4.5.3

Require supervisors to take a proactive role

Though the CMU CERT technical staff’s best practices addresses training
supervisors to detect and respond to concerning behavior, the vital role of the supervisor
as an integrator is not captured. In addition to monitoring for suspicious behavior, the
supervisor should look for signs of stress, especially if the supervisor is aware of the
occurrence of stressful events. Supervisors work closely with their supervisees and may
be able to gain insight into their personalities, predispositions, needs, and relationships
within the or ganization. The supervisor can also work to keep the insider’s expe ctations
at a realistic level and hopefully alleviate disgrunt lement (Cappelli et al., 2007). The
supervisor should have access to personnel records; of particular interest is any pattern of
concerning behavior. Additionally, the supervisor needs to properly issue sanctions for
inappropriate or unauthorized behavior and document these in the insider’s records. The
supervisor is the first line of defense and plays a significant role in mitigating insider
threat.
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The USAF policies discuss the storing of unfavorable information in an
employee’s SIF. Incidents related to theft, family abuse, unauthorized use of weapons,
and embezzlement are examples of what can be included in this repos itory. The SIF is a
tool used to determine an employee’s eligibility for access to classified information.
This best practice relates to several of the variables in the Insider Threat Model
for Sabotage and Espionage, to include Personal Dispositions, Positive Relationships
with Co-Workers, Negative Relationships with Co-Workers, Personal Needs, Discovering
Harmful Actions, Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions, Sanctions,
Sanctioning Relative to Insider Actions, Stressful Events, and Insider Stress. These are
highlights in yellow in the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage (Figure 24).

4.6 Summary
This chapter explained the methodology of the content analysis conducted on the
DoD and USAF policies, to include a description of the CMU CERT’s best practices.
This chapter also discussed the results of the review; key actors, tools, and areas of focus
were identified in addition to shortfalls and conflicts. Recommenda tions were presented
that the USAF could implement in order to better prevent, detect, and respond to
malicious insider attacks. Lastly, the chapter discussed three new best practices aimed at
helping all organizations with this complex problem.
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V. Conclusions

5.1 Summary of the Problem
This research showed how significant the insider threat problem currently is for
all organizations. In addition, the difficulty of the problem was explained, to include a
discussion of the fact that there is no definitive profile for malicious insiders,
organizations have placed trust in these ind ividuals, and ins ide rs have a vast advantage of
knowing their organization’s personnel, security policies, and information systems.
This research covered many aspects of the insider threat problem, to include
common psychological, professional, legal, and economic characteristics and behaviors
of malicious insiders, as well as technical precursors which have been documented in
historic attacks. The roles played by an insider’s expectations, insider’s motivations,
event triggers, and social networks were analyzed as well. In addition, factors attributed
to the organization, such as controls, priorities, and trust, were discussed.
In order to review the USAF policies against the most appropriate model, this
research conducted insider threat modeling. Initially a logical data model and a system
dynamics model were developed based on previous models from Tuglular (2000) and the
CMU CERT technical staff.

Once that was accomplished, the Abstracted Common

Model was chosen as the basis of this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and
Espiona ge, due largely to its abs tractness and inclus ion of bo th espionage and sabotage.
There was also an explanation of the incorporation of motivations, or ganizational
priorities, and social networks into this research’s final model. These three variables all
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play significant roles in the insider threat problem and were shown to be relevant to the
USAF.
The DoD and USAF polices were reviewed in terms of how well they addresses
both the variables of the Inside r Threat Mode l for Sabotage and Espionage and the best
practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff. The results of the policy review
were presented, foc using on shortfalls and conflicts. This research offered actionable
recommendations that the USAF can implement in order to better prevent, detect, and
respond to malicious insider attacks. The most significant area for improvement is the
utilization of its workforce. All personnel should be trained on observable behaviors that
can be precursors to malicious activity. Additionally, supervisors need to be empowered
as the first line of defense, monitoring for stress, unmet expectations, and disgruntlement.
In addition, this research proposed the following best practices that can be used by any
organization to mitigate this threat to security: screening for prior concerning behaviors,
predispositions, and technical incidents, issuing sanctions for inappropriate technical acts,
and requiring supervisors to take a proactive role.

5.2 Thesis Conclusions
Mitigating the threat from malicious insiders necessitates a solution that involves
people, processes, and technology. The USAF is indeed utilizing technology to protect
itself against insider attacks. The policies outline the use of such tools as intrusion
detection systems, network activity monitoring devices, virus signatures, and strong
encryption. One recommendation in this area is to utilize hash functions to compare the
baseline and current state of files to detect alterations.
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The USAF also has many strict policies in place to mitigate this problem,
covering such as topics as strong passwords, least privilege, extra caution with privileged
users, backup plans, and access control. The USAF also conducts extensive background
checks on its employees, following the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information.”

This research did have several

recommendations in this area, to include more detailed procedures regarding account
deactivation, remote access, and privileged users and actions. Additionally, the USAF
needs to limit the power of a single individual; this can be done by increasing the
separation of duties and not just for technical procedures. Frequent and rando m checks
for bogus accounts (“back doors”) should be conducted as well. Additional guidance for
auditing could help to improve this area of weakness, to include for which activities to
look, how often logs are reviewed, and how long logs should be maintained. Lastly the
steps of evaluating controls and determining likelihood and impact need to be included in
the risk management process.

It is also important that leadership is involve in this

assessment as the leaders have greater insight into mission impact than those working
solely on network ope rations.
The USAF’s largest area in which it could improve is in utilizing its workforce to
help fight against this problem. First of all, all employees should receive training and
awareness regarding insider threat. Areas of focus should include tactics that may be
directed at them, such as social engineering, and suspicious behavior which they can help
detect and report. It is also important that all employees are aware of their or ganization’s
security policies.

This understanding enhances the likelihood of the policies being

followed and therefore improves their effectiveness. The knowledge may also deter
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potential malicious insiders if they understand all the controls in place, such as
monitoring and sanctions. Training could include discussion-based workshops during
which co-workers run through scenarios to practice identifying the observable behaviors
and actions. Supervisors additionally need to develop relationships with their supervisees
in order to help reduce unmet expectations, disgruntlement, and stress.

It is also

important for supervisors to document concerning behaviors and events, as well as ensure
sanctions are issued (e.g., employee intervention or restriction of access).

Lastly,

supe rvisors and co-workers can bo th help the or ganizations in gaining insight into the
other insiders’ personalities and needs as they work most closely with them.

5.3 Impact of this Research
Given how significant the insider problem is and how damaging a successful
attack could be, the shortfalls identified in this research should be of concern to the
USAF. By suggesting solutions, this research hopes to assist the USAF in improving its
stance against malicious insiders.

The new recommended best practices can aid all

organizations in mitigating this threat.

5.4 Possibilities for Future Research
While this research examined 19 DoD and USAF documents from the
communications, IA, personnel security, and special investigations arenas, this review
was certainly not exhaustive. Additionally, there will certainly be new policies and
directives that will be published in the future that could b e examined in terms of how they
help to mitigate this problem.

Additionally, during the September 2008 interview
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(Cappe lli and Moore, 2008), the CMU CERT technical staff members said they were
working on an upda ted version of the “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and
Detection of Insider Threats” (Cappe lli et al., 2006). Once this is released, there will
mostly likely be new best practices that could be compared to the DoD and USAF
policies.
While this research chose to use the Insider Threat Mode l for Sabotage and
Espionage for a content analysis, other tests or analyses could have been run.

For

example, the model could be compared to a single case study, such as the Hanssen or
Lloyd case, or a multitude of cases to see how well it captures the variables in real insider
attacks.
Since there is no definitive profile and many of the warning signs are in the form
of humanly observable behaviors, or ganizations are still depe ndent on humans to prevent
attacks.

As discussed in the conclus ions, the most important mitigating factors are

human beings. As mentioned in Chapter IV, supervisors are vital players in detecting
these behaviors. An area for further examination is the integration of insider threat
mitigation strategies into the training given to new supervisors. Currently, the training
includes subject areas such as conduct, discipline, and performance management for
which insider threat information could possibly be incorporated (Drake, 2009).
Future research could also work to make progress in information systems having
the ability to sense and analyze activities and behaviors, with the goal being to attempt to
automate human reasoning. Ideally, if these systems felt that a particular user was a
threat, they could alert leadership within the organization and possibly execute an
automated response, such as denying the user further access to information systems.
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The six different motives (Casey, 2004) examined in this research are not
exclusively related to the insider threat problem, or even solely to information security.
These motives have been used to gain insight into criminal behavior in general.
Similarly, there may be other criminology research and models which could shed light
onto the insider threat problem.
Lastly, the insider threat problem could be examined in terms of force protection
concepts since it is inherently a security issue. There could be fundamental security
concepts that have not yet been applied to its mitigation.
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Appendix A: Detailed Policy Review
1. Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments.
• Actors- DoD CIO, DISN DAA, Heads of DoD components, AFCA,
AFIWC, 92 IWAS, AFOSI, AFNOSC, NCC, wing and base host units,
MAJCOM, NAF, and wing IA offices/programs/personnel,
program/project managers, CND personnel, ISSO
• Areas of Focus- DoD enterprise-wide, DoD component- level systems,
base-level, ports/protocol management, interconnected systems, enclaves,
individual IS, software (including patches), hardware, directives/technical
orders/specifications, configuration settings, architecture, system life-cycle
documents, wireless, biometrics, CONOPS, training and awareness
programs
• Too ls- DoD CIO Annual IA Report, DoD uniform risk criteria,
adjudicative process, IAVAs/IAVBs, C&A process, AFOSI-provided
information, AFCA and other independent audits/assessments (to include
Scope EDGE and 92 IWAS red teams), self-assessments, documented
threats/vulnerabilities, trend analysis, software tools, Vulnerability
Assessment Tool, network vulnerability or penetration testing, scans, logs,
IA secur ity incide nts and p atterns
• What is covered?
o Aspects of risk assessment from DoD CIO to NCC to individual
systems
o Analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, controls, risk
o Feedback/communication between levels
o Hierarchical structure
• What are the shortfalls?
o Likelihood determination
o Impact determination
• What are the conflicts? None
• What are recommendations?
o Determine likelihood and impact
o Prioritize critical assets
2. Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees.
• Actors- DoD CIO, SAF/XCI, Director of NSA, Heads of DoD
compo nents, HQ USAF/IL, HQ USAF/ILCO, HQ USAF/ILCX, AETC,
United States Air Force Academy, AFPC, AFOSI, AFCA (AFCA/WFP),
MAJCOM functional manager, MAJCOM & wing IA offices/programs,
wing/base host commanders/SC/units, Air Force Field Operating Agencies
and Direct Reporting Units, unit commanders, unit IA awareness
managers, Functional Systems Administrator, workgroup managers, DAA,
ISSM/O, certifier (in C&A process), users/network professionals (to
include military, civilian, guard, reserve, government contractors, foreign
national employees)
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Areas of Foc us
o Current, engaging, and relevant to the target audience to enhance
effectiveness; influence behavior; focus must be on actions that
empower the user; must understand critical reliance on IS & that
they are a critical link in IA pos ture
o Unauthor ized or illegal use of computer hardware and software
o Potential harm to national security due to the improper use of
information systems
o Consequences if policies and procedures are not followed
o Communications, network, emission, computer security
o Identification and a uthentication; password construction
o Internet “do’s and don’ts”
o Threats, vulnerabilities & countermeasures concerning tampering,
disclosures, modification, destruction, denial of service, fraud,
misappropriation, misuse, access by unauthorized persons, social
engineering, malicious code
o Safeguarding information processed, stored, or transmitted on all
these systems
o Availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation
o Privacy rights & consent to monitoring
o Security responsibilities
 Responding to and reporting suspicious activities and
conditions; h
 Protecting information and IT they access;; copyright,
ethics, and standards of conduct; malicious code; prevent
self- inflicted da mage
o Insider threat specific
 ‘Insider threats’
 Social engineering
 Countermeasures to protect systems and information from
sabotage & espionage
 Examples of internal threats such as malicious or
incompetent authorized users, users in the employ of
terrorist groups or foreign countries, disgruntled employees
or Service members, hackers, crackers, and self- inflicted
intentional or unintentional damage
 Threat posed by foreign intelligence, foreign governmentsponsored commercial enterprises, all pertinent terrorist
threats, and international narcotics trafficking or ganizations
Too ls
o Air Force IA Home Page ( https://private.afca.af.mil/ip)
o DoD CIO Annual IA Report
o Training/Courses- Air Force Information Assurance Awareness
Training” Computer-Based Training (CBT), resident courses,
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distributive or blended training, SOJT, exercises,
certification/recertification
 Initial military training- basic military training, O fficer
Training School, Air Force Reserve Officer Training
Corps, and specialized training in Air Force Specialty Code
(AFSC)-awarding courses
 Air University courses- formal schools and professional
military education courses
 Civilian career programs
o Counterintelligence Awareness Briefings
o Awareness materials- briefings, pamphlets, flyers, posters, base
bulletins, trifolds, screen savers, and videotapes
o Increased depth for students’ who may become involved in
planning, programming, managing, operating, or maintaining
information systems
o Assessments of training
What is covered?
o Try to grab everyone when I first begin working with military
o Annual refresher
What are the shortfalls?
o Unaware of website & AFOSI briefs
o Quality of training/method used- effectiveness of CBT
o Often refer to “IA training”- few specific references to “insider
threat”
o Need to discuss behaviors so employee know what to look for and
the y can repo rt
o Tie between SE and IT
What are the conflicts?
o We say users are “critical link” but the importance of this issue is
not stressed
What are recommendations?
o Enhanced training- discussion-based, video game, red team
outbriefs shared with more people
o IT material stressed and importance of every user- reportable
behaviors
o Tie between SE and IT

3. Enforce separation of duties and least privilege.
• Actors- Heads of DoD components, AFNOSC, NOSC, wing IA offices,
Top Secret Control Office, IAM, IAO, ISSM, ISSO, SA, authorized users,
• Areas of Focus- DoD enclaves; Top Secret material; Top Secret Control
Account; TCNOs; privileged users and access, privileged programs (OS,
system parameter and configuration files, and databases); privileged
utilities (assemblers, debuggers, and maintenance utilities); securityrelevant programs/data files (security monitor, pa ssword files, and audit
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files); web sites containing official information; intelligence, proprietary,
and control information; software/hardware/firmware; joint and coalition
partners, Voluntary Emeritus Corps
Too ls- None
What is covered?
o Obvious focus on TS, classified, privileged access
o Does cover broad issues of need-to-know
What are the shortfalls?
o IA functions, TCNOs & Top Secret Control Account inventory
were only specific activities with two-person compliance
o Only information system activities covered
What are the conflicts? None
What are recommendations?
o Would think more NOSC/NCC functions would be prime to
implement two-person compliance
o Need to make sure one person cannot be secretly doing things on
the network
o Applied to functions other than info systems

4. Implement strict password and account management policies and practices.
• Actors- NOSC, Red and Blue Team personnel, NCC, SA, FSA, unit
security manager, CSA,WGM, ISSO,
• Areas of Focuso Assign/maintain/delete user IDs/passwords/privileges,
suspended/transferred/terminated personnel, locking/unlocking
accounts, resetting passwords, updating e- mail addresses, one-time
password, password composition, dormant accounts, rapid retries
o Individual accountability, reusable generic/group usernames, nonrepudiation, s hared use of da ta
o Limit elevated privileges (service accounts, , loading new users,
password management, modifying and patching system routines or
files, examining memory locations, real-time monitoring of user
activities, trusted profile (e.g., system administrator, security
officer, root user, super user, backup operators)
o Remote session, password cracking, compromised passwords,
enclave, encryption, wireless, SNMP management
• Too ls- favorable background investigation, Personnel Security
Management Program, proper security clearance, two-factor
authentication, hardware tokens, PKI, policies, automated procedures (i.e.
via OS), password enforcement software, i-TRM password cracking tools,
IA program/annual training, assessments
• What is covered?
o Two of the most important issues
 individual accountability
 non-repudiation
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o Strong identification/authentication
o Monitoring accounts
o Actively searching for weaknesses
o Good they focus on privileged acct
What are the shortfalls?
o Humans- SE, laziness, writing down passwords, sharing
passwords
o No explicit check for creation of bogus accounts
 Yes, solid policies for granting an account (clearance,
background check, training), checking for dormant, and
terminating personnel who are leaving but what about
checks on the people doing this (CSA, SA)—should be
another person comparing accounts with valid users
 CMU- need to prevent backdoors
What are the conflicts? None
What are recommendations?
o Push for biometrics & increased use of PKI
o Training
 current- composition, identification/authentication
 need SE, diligence, not sharing
o Account checks- should be done frequently but randomly (CMU
quote)

5. Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions. Collect and save data for use in
investigations.
• Actors- ISSM, ISSO, SA, Heads of DoD components, DoD Component
IA program, IAT Level II Personnel, CND-A, CND-AU, AFOSI
• Areas of Focuso Weak configurations, security holes/deficiencies,
o Core network services and infrastructure devices, VPN tunnel,
system services for authentication
o Incidents, unusual/inappropriate activity
 Changing the security profile (e.g., access controls, security
level of the subject, user password)
 Successful/unsuccessful log- in attempts, file system
modifications, change in privileges
 Attempted/realized penetrations/intrusions, unauthorized
transmissions, unauthorized attempts to bypass automated
information systems security devices or functions,
unauthorized requests for passwords, or unauthorized
installation of mode ms or other devices into automated
information systems (including telephone systems) whether
classified or unclassified
o Inform users via consent to monitoring, associating the user’s
identity with all auditable actions
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o Unencrypted (clear text) passwords, incorrectly entered passwords,
or character strings; access to the audit trail file; info directly to the
user
Too ls- audit/monitoring/error/host/network traffic/firewall/intrusion
detection logs/files, intrusion detection tools, deployable CND audit
toolkit, IS aborts/suspends unauthorized user activity
What is covered?
o Checking individual system, network activity (log- in,
modifications), firewall
o Includes special mention of VPN—good since insiders often use
o Attributing each action to a individual
o Suspicious activities- file modifications, privilege/security
changes, unauthor ized transmissions, bypa sses
What are the shortfalls?
o Training/awareness- consent to monitoring
o Additional suspicious activity to look at
 sudden change in activity (working earlier/later,
printing/transmitting more files, accessing files they don’t
need for work)
 would require creating baselines
o Lots of discussion of collect but nothing that I saw about saving
(how long, format, etc)
What are the conflicts?
o Do we have the time and manpower to do all this and e ven more
with personnel and b udget cuts?
What are recommendations?
o Training/awareness- want to tell them what is being looked at
specifically
o Guidance on cataloging/storing logs and reports
o Create baselines if monitoring more activities

6. Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged users.
• Actors- Heads of the DoD Components, Wing IA Office, IAM,
commanders and or supervisors
• Areas of Focus- contractors, Automated Information Systems (increased
monitoring), separation of functions, personal accounts with domain
administrative privileges, passwords, i- TRM password cracking tools
• Too ls- favorable National Agency Check, local agency check, a nd credit
check, written inquiries, investigations, DOD issued PKI certificates/
hardware tokens, preparatory & sustaining DoD IA training a nd
certification requirements, Privileged Access Agreement,”
• What is covered?
o Background c hecks
o Separating personal and privileged accounts
o Separation of functions
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What are the shortfalls?
o “Maintain visibility” is very passive
o “Extra monitoring” for AIS- vague
What are the conflicts? None
What are recommendations?
o Explicit policies for monitoring sys admin (checks and ba lances)
 User account creation, modifications, running scripts,
recommended policy changes, modifying logs

7. Actively defend against malicious code.
• Actors- HQ AFCA/EVP, AFIWC, AFNOSC, NOSC, NCC, Information
Protection Operations personnel, CND- IS, CND-A, program manager,
DAA, ISSO, CSA, authorized users
• Areas of Focus- wireless, web sites, E-mail, rules/signatures,
freeware/firmware/shareware/public domain software, timeliness of
changes, removable and fixed media
• Too ls- AFCERT/DoD CERT sites, CSAP Database System,
antivirus tools/signature files/software, software patches and security
fixes, user awareness training, local policies, configuration management,
virus scan, malicious logic reports
• What is covered?
o Strength- signature-based
o Big focus on viruses
o Help from abo ve
o Look ing at array of mediums (software, e- mail, websites)
o Taking a lot of control out of the hands of normal user
• What are the shortfalls?
o Weakness- statistical-based
o No baselines of configurations
• What are the conflicts?
o Baselines can be expensive to create and update
o May need various types depe nding on user role
• What are recommendations?
o Create hashes of baselines of both software and hardware
conf igur ations so you can detect a change (such as hash functions
of key files- windo ws explorer and task manager)
8. Use layered defense against remote attacks.
• Actors- NOSC, NCC, ANG NCC, IAM, IAO
• Areas of Focus- back-door access, additional network interface (modem,
wireless, etc.), privileged access, High Impact PII electronic records,
disconnecting dormant session, encryption
• Too ls- VPN client software, access tables, audit logs, NIST-certified
cryptography, proxy services, screened subnets, DMZ
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What is covered?
o Restrictions on privileged actions and sensitive info
o Maintaining logs (increased attention to privileged actions)
o Call- forwarding
What are the shortfalls?
o Does not spell out who validates need for remote access
o Does not discuss termination of accts- hopefully the same as other
accounts
What are the conflicts? None
What are recommendations?
o Explicitly spell out who grants permission to remote access
o Explicitly spell out policy on disabling with termination of role
“discouraged”

9. Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.
• Actors- AFOSI, Central Adjudication Facility, commanders, security
officials, NCC OIC, IAO, AF Government Charge Card program
coordinators, authorized users,
• Areas of Focuso Theft, embezzlement, bankruptcy petitions, indebtedness
o Unauthorized sale or use of firearms, explosives/dangerous
weapons, alleged criminal activity
o Child or spouse abuse, child advocacy reports
o Misuse or improper disposition of government property or other
unlawful activities, Government Charge Card abuses and misuses,
o AFOSI reports of investigation; civil/police/security forces
incident/complaint reports; administrative/disciplinary actions to
include records of counseling, letters of reprimand, Article 15,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or courts- martial orde rs
o Medical or mental health evaluations
o Action that threatens the secur ity of, or da mages/harms network o r
government communications systems, IA-related events and
potential threats and vulnerabilities invo lving a DoD information
system
o Foreign intelligence or any terrorist organization may have
targeted for pos sible intelligence exploitation, request for illegal or
unauthorized access to classified or unclassified controlled
information, contact with a known or suspected intelligence
officer, contact with foreign d iplomatic establishment, suspected
espionage, terrorism, spying, treason, unlawful intelligence
activities, sedition, subversion
o Sabotage, unauthorized technology transfer, contemplated/
attempted/effected the deliberate compromise or unauthorized
release of classified or unclassified controlled information
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Too ls- security information file, information assurance policies, special
investigation policies
What is covered? criminal activity, technical precursors, financial,
problems in family,
What are the shortfalls?
o Acting o ut of character, alarming s tatements
o Foreign travel- does discuss relationships with foreign people,
especially intelligence personnel or terrorists
What are the conflicts?
o Poor duty performance- sign that they no longer care, will harm
organization
o Following could be early signs or mean more when pieced
together- disciplinary issues, o ne-time alcohol related incident,
single isolated incident of poor judgment based on immaturity or
extenuating circumstances
What are recommendations?
o Should definitely include poor job performance, especially if it was
good and has worsened (to include tardiness, absences, not
meeting deadlines, quality of work)
o Need to look at alcohol incidents and any other addictions
(gambling)
o Also include unusual behavior, signs of stress

10. Deactivate computer access following termination.
• Actors- NCC, NOSC, SA, WGM, CSA, FSA
• Areas of Focus- E- mail account, SNMP management, user accounts
• Too ls- procedures
• What is covered? E- mail, SNMP, user accounts
• What are the shortfalls?
 “Ensure procedures are in place” is quite weak
 E- mail still available for 60 da ys—could send a virus—
would most likely be trusted
• What are the conflicts? None
• What are recommendations?
o Standard, s trict procedures to ensure deletion or all accounts and
privileges
 Spell out checking SA, database, remote access, and other
privileged accounts
o Shorter (or no grace period) with e- mail
11. Implement secure backup and recovery processes.
• Actors- AFNOSC, NOSC, NCC, IA Officer, IAT Level III Personnel, IA
Manager (IAM) Level I Personnel
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Areas of Focus- IA requirements/features/procedures, NCC managed
servers, NOSC managed core services, enclaves
Too ls- Continuity of Operations Plan, quarterly tests, monitoring by IA
officers, assistance from AFNOSC
What is covered?
o Good that there is help from above
o Daily backups for their systems
o Procedures/plans/COOP
o Quarterly tests
What are the shortfalls?
o Vague
 Redunda ncy?
 Ghost images?
What are the conflicts? None
What are recommendations? More concrete plans—perhaps do not have
those in public domain

12. Analyze current access control policies and practices and identify and evaluate
options to mitigate insider threat risk.
• Actors- USAF/CVA, AFIWC/IO, AFNOSC, MAJCOM/CC or MAJCOM
NOSCs, FSA, DAA, ISSO, unit commanders, IAO, Foreign Disclosure
Office, authorized users
• Areas of Focuso Individual Ready Reserve, vendo r maintenance personnel,
contractors, foreign nationals, volunteers, summer- hire employee,
privileged user with IA responsibilities
o Classified/controlled unclassified information/media/products,
SIPRNET, remote access, shared files, stand-alone system,
enclaves, AIS applications, outsourced IT-based processes,
platform IT interconnections, specialized CND systems (e.g.,
firewalls and intrusion prevention systems)
o Backdoors and unauthorized connections, building and area entry
controls, interim access, deleting access
• Too ls- level of the pos ition, identification/authentication/authorization,
mission needs, clearances, favorable trustworthiness investigation,
supe rvision, user licensing, IT po sition categor y requirements and
qualifications, IA awareness and training, need to know, sanitization,
network components using MAC, Access Control Lists, classification
level of the information, mission assurance category, secur ity do main,
releasability/sensitivity of information, SSAA
• What is covered?
o Special users- foreign nationals, privileged users, volunteers, etc
o High-risk items- SIPRNET, classified, controlled, special systems
o Policies- Identification/authentication, clearances, need-to-know,
mission
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What are the shortfalls? Only mention of checking ACLs is to “manage”
or “update” for CND & SDP routers
What are the conflicts? None
What are recommendations?
o ACLs- should be reviewed randomly and often, looking for
oversights and phony/backdoor accounts

13. Clearly Document Insider Threat Controls
• Actors- No explicit but incorporated into the above controls
• Areas of Focus- No explicit but incorporated into the above controls
• Too ls- No explicit but incorporated into the above controls
• What is covered?
o Limited training/awareness
o Limited reportable behavior
• What are the shortfalls?
o Many listed above
• What are the conflicts? See above
• What are recommendations?
o Abo ve recommenda tions
o Perhaps its own section within instructions
o Sanctions (for inappropriate technical acts)
• Actors- CAF, commander, DAA, CSA
• Areas of Focus- access to classified information, SCI and SAP access,
unescorted entry to restricted areas, security clearance, license
suspension
• Too ls- SIF, determination if individual is threat to network, licensing
principles (failure to maintain an acceptable level of proficiency on a
critical program; actions that threaten the security of a network or a
governmental communications system; actions that may result in
damage or harm to a network or governmental communications
system; or actions that constitute unauthorized use under the
provisions of AFI 33-119, Air Force Messaging, or AFI 33-129, Web
Management and Internet Use)
• What is covered?
o Suspension, loss of clearance, access to information/resources
o Looks at SIF, licensing principles
• What are the shortfalls?
o Employee intervention
• What are the conflicts?
• What are recommendations?
o Intervention to limit disgruntlement—need to get at root of
problem

138

•

Organization's Prioritization of Profit
• Actors- None
• Areas of Focus- None
• Too ls- None
• What is covered? Not covered
• What are the shortfalls? None
• What are the conflicts?
o AF is not profit-oriented so should be willing to spend more on
controls but we are restricted by federal budget
• What are recommendations? None

o Organization's Prioritization of Reputation
• Actors- None
• Areas of Focus- None
• Too ls- None
• What is covered? Not covered
• What are the shortfalls? None
• What are the conflicts?
o We should be highly concerned with reputation, again making
us want to invest in controls (but have budget that restrains us)
• What are recommendations? None
o Organization's Trust of Insider
• Actors- None
• Areas of Focus- complete confidence cannot be achieved, access
decisions, secure environment, classified information
• Too ls- adjudicative guidelines, risk management
• What is covered?
o Risk management approach, critical assets that are of highest
importance, background investigations
o All three categories covered
• What are the shortfalls? None
• What are the conflicts? None
• What are recommendations? None
o Insider Stress
• Actors- None
• Areas of Focus- None
• Too ls- None
• What is covered? Not covered
• What are the shortfalls?
o Role of supervisor and co-workers
• What are the conflicts? None
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What are recommendations?
o Supervisor and co-worker responsibility
o Would not see it in SIF, but intervention is important
o Co-workers report to supervisor

o Stressful Event
• Actors- None
• Areas of Focus- None
• Too ls- None
• What is covered? Not covered
• What are the shortfalls?
o Role of supervisor and co-workers
• What are the conflicts? None
• What are recommendations?
o If supervisor knows of event should be more on the lookout for
changes in be havior
o Co-workers should report to supervisor
o Personal Predispos itions
• Actors- Surgeon General, Heads of the DoD Compo nents, Mental
Health Clinic
• Areas of Focuso Sabotage, espionage
o Criminal conduct- serious offense, several minor , d ishonorable
discharge, parole/probation,
o Physical, mental, or emotional conditions
o Allegiance to the United States- treason, terrorism, sedition,
dual citizen and/or possess/use a foreign passport,
employment/service to foreign organizations
o Sexual behavior- criminal, poor judgment
o Personal conduct- disloyalty, unreliability, untrustworthy, lack
of sound judgment, irresponsibility, lack of candor, disruptive,
violent, inappropriate behavior in the workplace, dishonesty or
rule violations, dishonesty, unwillingness to comply with rules
and regulations, breach of client confidentiality
o Financial considerations- inability to live within one's means,
satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations; unexplained
affluence
o Add ictions- drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling problems (and
related incidents)
• Too ls- SIF, Adjudicative Guidelines
• What is covered? criminal, mental, US allegiance, addictions,
conduct/behavior, financial
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What are the shortfalls? personality- malicious, egotistical, social
skills, resistant to change
What are the conflicts? None
What are recommendations?
o Personality profile- from past co-workers, supervisors, friends,
family

o Positive Relationships with Co-Workers
• Actors- None
• Areas of Focus- None
• Too ls- None
• What is covered? Not covered
• What are the shortfalls? supervisors’ role
• What are the conflicts? None
• What are recommendations?
o Supervisors especially should be monitoring
relationships/influences on their employees
o Negative Relationships with Co-Workers
• Actors- Background clearance investigators
• Areas of Focuso Allegiance to the United States- sympathy/association with
people committing sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or
sedition
o Association with persons involved in criminal activity
• Too ls- Adjudicative Guidelines
• What is covered?
o Allegiance
o Criminal activity
• What are the shor tfalls?
o Association with co-workers committing precursory events at
work (technical, behavioral)
• What are the conflicts? None
• What are recommendations?
o Supervisors especially should be monitoring
relationships/influences on their employees
o Personal Needs
• Actors- CAF
• Areas of Focuso Financial considerations- inability to live within one's means,
satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations; unexplained
affluence, embezzlement, frivolous spending, gambling
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o Foreign influence
1. Espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition
2. Substantial business, financial, or property interest in a
foreign country
Too ls- Adjudicative Guidelines
What is covered?
o Foreign & financial influences
What are the shortfalls?
o Need for revenge, recognition, prove themselves, boost one’s
self-confidence, sadistic, achieve satisfaction
What are the conflicts?
What are recommendations?
o Look for these personality characteristics- need for recognition,
need to prove themselves, sadistic
o Look for development of disgruntlement

o Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions
• Actors- Background clearance investigators
• Areas of Focuso Handling protected information- disclosure, copying, storing in
unauthorized location, unapproved equipment, outside one's
need to know, negligence or lax security habits
o Use of IT systems- noncompliance with rules, procedures,
guidelines or regulations; illegal or unauthorized entry,
modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access;
downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on
or to any unauthorized software, hardware, or information
technology system; unauthorized use, introduction, removal, or
duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to or
from any information technology system without authorization;
negligence or lax security habits
• Too ls- Adjudicative Guidelines
• What is covered?
o This covers initial/historical technical information—rest if
covered by monitoring & auditing
• What are the shortfalls?
o Behavior- we need to be training our employees on what to
look for so they can actually detect it
• What are the conflicts? None
• What are recommendations?
o Training
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